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The significance in anthropological interpretation of 
meaning--i.e., the meaning that the people studied attri­
bute to their, own world view--has, of late, diminished in 
importance. Many social scientists have attempted to con­
struct theoretical models that seek to avoid incorpora­
tion of this type of meaning. The extreme behaviorist 
model of an eminent anthropologist is reviewed and defi­
ciencies are noted.
Research was confined largely to library facilities. 
However, during the course of a year’s involvement with a 
subcultural group (poker players), it became evident that 
a major tenet of this paper was being graphically demon­
strated. In addition, a metaphorical parallel, between 
a player’s.approach to the game of poker and anthropolog­
ical methodology, arose.
Anthropological investigations and subsequent interpre­
tations must initially seek to establish a foundation 
based on an understanding of the subject culture. Only 
when this is achieved can meaningful models of analysis 
be constructed. The role of participant observation is 
best suited for obtaining this requisite wedding of 
method.
Director: Frank B. Bessac
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Recently, proponents of various methodological trends 
in anthropology have sought to emphasize behavioralistic 
doctrines at the expense of less extreme doctrines such as 
the emic and etic. Basically, the behavioralists propose 
formulating theoretical abstractions with disregard for 
cultural centered meaning. If this format is pursued to its 
logical conclusion, the following scenario could very well 
become commonplace:
Outside, cold white flakes were still falling.
Inside his cave, the man sat before the fire and 
began to butcher the last of his hunt; he attempted 
to recount the storm’s duration. There had been 
seven periods of daylight since it had begun. This 
was unusual and he hoped it would soon stop as his 
supply of food was running short. From pervious ex­
perience he had learned that hunting was useless 
when the world was heavily laden with a white blanket. 
He turned his attention to his mate and watched as 
she fed their baby. His mind wandered; it was com­
forting to know that soon he would have help in the
1
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eternal quest for food. Their skins were beginning 
to show signs of wear and would have to be replaced. 
The tasks of survival never ceased. One thing he 
did not have to worry about, however, was a dry 
place to live. The cave served that function very 
well; in fact, it was one of the.best caves he had 
seen in his life. He would have to experiment with 
some new tools, for the ones he used now were quite 
hard to hold. Their size and weight were such as to 
make any attempt to utilize them a tiring experience. 
He smiled as his child began to cry; it was a good 
healthy cry and soon he would have to begin training 
him in the arts of survival. He was happy.
As he returned his attention to the game he was 
preparing, he caught a movement out of the corner of 
his eye. Before he could turn, he heard his woman 
scream; simultaneously the large cat slammed into 
him. Grasping his tool he began to beat upon his 
assailant, but it proved useless. The fangs and 
claws were like hot embers from the fire as they 
raked his body. Quickly he felt his life begin to 
ebb from him. With his remaining strength, he 
grasped a stick from the fire and drove it deep into 
the soft underbelly of the cat. The mauling still 
continued. His mate’s screams were barely audible;
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his final thought was a hope that he had wounded his 
assailant sufficiently to save his woman and child.
The woman, horrified hut unable to assist her 
dying mate, began to retreat into the interior of 
the cave. However, as she left the fire and entered 
the darkened reaches of the chamber, she tripped and 
fell. Still clutching her baby, she sought to regain 
her feet. But now the action drew the great cat's 
attention; he began to stalk her. His wound was begin­
ning to result in a loss of strength, but he doggedly 
continued the chase. As the woman again began to re­
treat, he sprang. Vainly she tried to fend off the 
attack, and .indeed without the burden of the child, 
her efforts would have been successful. Hov/ever, the 
cat continued to maul her and in her last moments of 
life, she placed the baby under her and laid across 
it so that her body might protect and hide it from 
the attacker. To this end she was successful, for as 
she died, the great cat departed.
The cat staggered slowly toward the entrance of 
the cave. Rapidly now he could, feel his life drain­
ing away. As he approached the fire, he found move­
ment almost impossible. Thus, he lay down to rest 
near the warmth of the open fire and within a few 
moments perished. The baby lived. But as the days
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passed without feeding, he too died. So, as the 
snow continued to form a white veil across the 
mouth of the cave, did one small unit of the 
animal Homo Sapiens write its final chapter of 
life. However, the story would, remain indelibly 
■written in the ground; and the passing years would 
cover and preserve the tale with natural deposits 
of soil.
ft * * A *
The crew' of project Y2592 was returning from their ex­
cavation in northern Wyoming. Three months previously they 
had embarked from the International Center of Archaeology 
to excavate an early-man site in the northern Great Plains 
of the United States. Their purpose had been to resolve the 
long-standing debate surrounding the taxonomic problem of a 
pre-projectile point stage in the chronology of early man in 
North America.
Since its founding, all archaeological research was as­
signed to the Center, and virtually all efforts had been 
oriented toward formulating an International Taxonomic Sys­
tem. Their expedition had been formed solely for the pur­
pose of resolving the only remaining problem, one that had 
dogged North American pre-history scholars for seven decades. 
Preliminary computer evaluation of data submitted directly 
from the field indicated the evidence was conclusive.
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This project was headed by Professor Minerva, who fif­
teen years earlier had been instrumental in founding the 
Center and directing its efforts in pursuit of a complete 
taxonomy. After years of devoted work, he had eliminated 
humanistic thinking from the discipline of archaeology and 
oriented all of the Center*s efforts into the systematic 
reckoning necessary for ’’purely scientific research.'' Now, 
all data were systematically reduced to statistical inter­
pretation and programmed into the computer for synthesis, 
often directly from the field via portable computer terminals. 
Thus, an archaeologist returning from the field would find a 
preliminary report of his work already prepared by the com? 
puter, and all that remained was an audit and preparation■ 
of the final report draft.
As a reward for Professor Minerva’s tireless efforts, 
the directors of the Center had chosen him to direct the his­
toric project Y2592. Upon returning to the Center, Professor 
Minerva had retired directly to his quarters for a hot shower 
and a good night’s sleep. He arose late the next morning, 
and hurried to his office without pause for breakfast. He 
was anxious to see the preliminary analysis of his data and 
begin the final draft of the report. The project had been
quite successful, he thought. Not only had the site been a
\
stratigraphic wonderland, but its material spanned time from 
present day to pre-historic occupation. The bottom level of
6
the cave, while confirming previous taxonomic categoriza­
tions, had yielded conclusive evidence for resolution of the 
objective problem. The charcoal from the fire hearth and 
skeletal material had already been submitted to the dating 
laboratory and a date of greater than 40,00 0 years ago had 
been assigned. Eight samples from this level had been sub­
mitted to the dating laboratory and each was tested sepa­
rately under varying conditions. All dates had proven 
uniform; thus it. was conclusive that the associated material 
was over 17,000 years older than later material from the 
cave’s earliest projectile point level.
As expected, the preliminary report had preceded his 
arrival, and as the professor read through it, he made oc­
casional corrections. The report was replete with statis­
tical charts and tables. He painstakingly checked each one 
and inevitably arrived at the same conclusion as that of 
the computer. Finally, he arrived at the analysis of the 
bottom level. The skeletal material had been identified as: 
one Homo sapiens male, one Homo sapiens female, one Homo 
sapiens infant, one saber tooth tiger and countless varying 
species of local fauna of the period. The charcoal was 
identified as having come from the fire hearth. The seven 
large crudely flaked percussion instruments were categorized 
as knives and scrapers. Coming at last to the conclusion of 
this chapter, he read in part:
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from the skeletal evidence, it is to be con­
cluded that occupation of this site at this 
level consisted of one family unit of the 
animal, Homo sapiens. This animal had oc­
cupied the cave for an extensive period of 
time, demonstrated by the frequency distribu­
tion of other fauna and identification of. a 
single fire hearth with a large deposit of 
charcoal in association. The saber tooth 
tiger had only recently been killed for sub­
sistence as evidenced by its skeleton being 
intact. Cause of death of the three Homo 
sapiens is unknown. The presence of only 
seven percussion artifacts coupled with the 
complete absence of evidence of the tech­
nology necessary for projectile point manu­
facturing substantiates the presence of condi­
tion alpha, i.e., a pre-projectile stage in 
the taxonomy of North American Archaeology.
The remainder of the report consisted of additional tables
and final summation.
Professor Minerva distinctly recalled transmitting data 
concerning a small amount of charcoal found in direct associa­
tion with the large cat, and the unique position of.the female, 
and infant Homo sapiens skeletons. He realized when he sub­
mitted them that there was no relevancy, but he had done so 
anyway. The analysis confirmed his opinion. There was no 
technique available within archaeological methodology to 
interpret these phenomena. Nothing meaningful could be ob­
tained in terms of statistical or systematic synthesis. Any 
explanation would have to be made in terms of unverifiable 
speculation.
With conclusive evidence from various.sites, including 
Friesenhahn cave and the Lewisville, Tule Springs, and
8
American Falls sites, a pre-projectile point stage would be 
included in the taxonomic system for North America. Noxv 
the center could begin its primary task, creating a compre­
hensive interpretation of world prehistory in terms of the 
data stored in the computer files. It was an ambitious 
project but with the techniques of analysis available, suc­
cess was inevitable.
There exist two major themes in the preceding scenario.
1First, the purpose of excavating the site stands as an etic 
endeavor--to gather data for comparative studies of artifact 
types. Secondly, there is an emic element--what' transpired 
at the cave that had primary importance to the actual partici­
pants. The inhabitants of the cave could not visualize the 
relevance of their tools to a general typological scheme, 
derived from an alien culture. However, we can assume that 
all people are concerned about the situation that occurred 
at the cave and a knowledge of their reaction to the situa­
tion could afford a basis for comparative studies of an emic 
nature; e.g., the willingness to sacrifice for others.
Due to the necessity of excavation, archaeology, unlike 
the other subfields within the discipline of anthropology, 
is a destructive enterprise. When a site is excavated, the
. ^Etic may be loosely defined as a method of interpreta­
tion predicated upon cross cultural meaning. Emic methods 
are limited to meaning derived from a singular culture, i.e., 
meaning a culture attributes to its own phenomenon. An in- 
depth discussion of these,terms appears in chapter 4.
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interrelationships and associations contained within it are 
destroyed. Therefore', it is essential that the archaeologist 
attempt to obtain meaning from his data; meaning in terms of 
etic method and also meaning obtained from emic understand­
ing. Professor Minerva obtained from his excavation a solu­
tion to his problem but, as a result of his methodology, he 
failed to understand what transpired at the cave.
If we accept that the purpose of anthropology is to un­
cover the "story” of man, then it is essential we seek to 
recover as much of the complete story as possible. In per­
spective, the drama that transpired at the cave is of little 
consequence. However, what is important is that Professor 
Minerva's methodological technique would have prevented 
uncovering what occurred, should it have been significant.
Anthropology is committed, to an "holistic" approach. In 
generalized terminology what is implied by the term "holistic" 
is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.. How­
ever, more specifically, the anthropologist seeks to study a 
culture for its own sake in terms of its many interrelation­
ships, to study one institution, e.g., economics, as it 
interrelates with others. One need only look at our way of 
life; we do not live it in terms of components, but rather 
as an integrated whole. So it is for the peoples we study.
If the anthropologist were simply to observe, his perspective 
would be limited to aggregates and numbers. Instead, he
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seeks to view relationships from below the vantage of super­
ficial observation. The emic approach is merely one type of 
holistic approach. With regard to the scenario, it is the 
killing of the occupants that would have been most vital to 
an emic or similar approach, not the chronological position 
of the tools.
It is my belief that an emic understanding plays a very 
fundamental and a priori role in anthropological methodology. 
A creditable Ethnological and Archaeological investigation 
must insure its utilization. Several currently popular 
methods place equal, or near equal, emphasis on utilizing 
both the emic and the etic. These methods require that both 
be used in tandem, but \vlth the former necessarily preceding 
the latter.
The author realizes that either aspect of this method 
may be used without its complement, but instances when, this 
is possible are very few and will be dismissed for piarposes 
of this paper. My purpose is to outline the emic and etic 
methods in conjunction with the participant observer tech­
nique and to point to some of the shortcomings of an extreme 
etic doctrine.
CHAPTER II
THE ANTHROPOLOGIST
At first glance there would appear, to the uninitiated, 
to be little to differentiate sociology from anthropology. 
But, although both disciplines appear to be concerned with 
similar phenomena, and share much methodology, a harder look 
at them reveals a number of differences. Because the author 
Ttfill concentrate entirely upon one of these differences, the 
scope and extent of investigation, this comparison is incom­
plete. The sociologist will stand temporarily for purpose 
of contrast.
Sociology accepts man (biologically) as a constant, con­
ceding no relevancy to the biological level of investigation 
for its purposes. Its concern lies in forming generaliza­
tions of social phenomena, stated in terms of social phe­
nomena, with little or no attempt at correlation to other 
levels of investigation, This methodology finds expression 
by Leslie A. White (1949:60) in his arguments for a cul­
turological approach in anthropology;
From the standpoint of the scientist, there 
is only one class of phenomena to be consid­
ered in any given situation. Even in bio­
chemistry, which might appear to include two 
classes of phenomena, we really have only 
one class: the possibility of referring bio­
chemical events to chemistry on the one hand 
and to biology on the other in no way negates
11
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the integrity of biochemical events as bio­
chemical phenomena. (1949:73) Cultural 
phenomena are super-, or supra-, psychological 
determinants of human behavior. They are 
super-psychological in the sense that it is 
beyond the scope of psychology to account for 
them. Psychology cannot explain, e.g., why 
one people has clans (behaves "clanwise") 
while another does not; why one people eats 
with knives and forks, another with chop­
sticks; why a people prohibits marriage, 
between parallel cousins but requires mar­
riage between cross cousins; why a tribe 
practices polyandry, observes the mother-in- 
law taboo, forms plurals by affixation, uses 
money, etc. Culture as culture can be ex­
plained only in terms of culture.
Sociology seeks to avoid cross-cultural interpretations;
it confines its analysis to social phenomena within a given 
society. The sociologist identifies a specific problem in 
relation to two or more social variables, e.g., crime and 
poverty, or economic status, divorce and social mobility.
In limiting their investigations to classes of social phe­
nomena, sociologists employ mass surveys, questionnaires, 
interviews, and so on. And while this approach yields 
abundant information in terms of breadth, it provides little
in the way of depth, i.e., an holistic interpretation. By
placing heavy reliance upon data gathered from use of ques­
tionnaires, the sociologist has removed himself from personal 
contact with his sources for.the.most part. This methodology 
has led to an assortment of very sophisticated statistical 
interpretations which exceed those of most anthropological 
studies.
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The terms depth and breadth refer to the scope or limita­
tions of investigation. Analysis of breadth encompass only 
those culture-particular elements that are relative to the 
world view of a singular culture or one or more subcultures 
within a culture as seen by members of that culture. Analysis 
o'f depth is concerned with both the culture particular and 
culture general (laws or theories, applicable to two or more 
cultures, derived from the culture of the investigator). 
Investigations, then, occur at two distinct levels.
It must be noted that the sociological method begins
from an emic point of view and never really escapes from it,
irrespective of the voluminous statistics and apparent "ob­
jectivity." One must be extremely careful in subcultural 
studies, for here research appears to rise above the emic 
into the etic. However, the careful reader will realize that 
while anthropological method is followed, the sociologist is 
incapable of becoming aware enough of cultural variation to 
carry on truly etic studies. The sociologist cannot achieve 
the detached objectivity required for etic analysis. The 
sociologist can become class or subculturally ethnic-centered, 
but this is not yet on an etic plateau. Perhaps the following 
will serve to clarify: The Eskimo have no generalized term
for snow. There exists several highly specialized terms for 
particular types of snow but no generalized concept. Along 
the same theme, skiers seldom refer to snow in a generalized
14
sense--their concern also centers on the type. Members of 
each of these disparate groups are too familiar with the 
subject to concentrate upon its commonness but rather pay 
attention to differences in type.
Since anthropology seeks analysis in terms of depth--not 
breadth--its most important single instrument of investiga-. 
tion is the participant observer. Fried (1972:21-22) observes 
that,
anthropologists emphasize intimacy with the 
• people whose society and culture they are study­
ing. Interviews and questionnaires may be an 
important part of the anthropologist's work but 
usually play a special role within it, enhancing 
rather than supplying the main body of data.
Thus, the anthropologist's means of data gathering is a less
formalized, less structured approach.
Methodology in anthropology is predicated upon an holistic 
approach which has interlaced themes; the study of man as a 
biological organism and as a cultural participant, and simul­
taneously studying any aspect of culture in the context of its 
interrelationships. This necessitates intimate contact between 
the anthropologist and his subject culture. Techniques of 
fieldwork, however, are somewhat of an aberration in that, they 
tend to be viewed as an art rather than a science. There is 
little formal training in these techniques as observed by 
Cohen and Naroll (1970:3-4):
Generally the anthropologist has been the only 
person capable of collecting and recording in­
formation on some remote corner of the earth.
This means that the fuller and more widely
15
ranging record he is able to bring back with 
him, the better. Besides this, and possibly 
dependent upon it, is the assumption that cul­
tures are integrated wholes, and to dissect 
such an entity without knowing all of it pro­
duces a high probability of error in the in­
terpretation. Therefore, a technique has been 
worked out by which the researcher uses his 
entire experience as a record of the society.
This experience can be manipulated to some de­
gree, but basically the person is the chief 
research instrument.
No wonder then, that the method was diffi­
cult to record and develop--it rested ulti­
mately on the person and the personality doing 
the work. Training could only help to "de- 
.center" the person by making him aware of the 
great variety of ways and means that have 
been devised by man in creating his society 
and culture. At the end of such training, 
very few if any of the practices known to 
have been carried out anywhere in the world 
seem strange to the student. Students were 
and are prepared not to be shocked, afraid 
or scandalized by any customs or practices 
found anywhere in the world. But beyond 
this attitudinal bias, very little else is 
done to prepare the would-be professional, , 
albeit this decentering process has been an 
important aspect of training and still is.
Since there are few, if any, formal techniques of field­
work, it is incumbent upon the individual anthropologist to 
develop his own personal style. This style is a result of 
his synthesizing many years of experience; for the most part 
it is nontransferable. Thus, the process of fieldwork, in 
a sense, is non-repetitive; it is a unique experience each 
time it is performed.
The preceding comments were predicated upon an assumption 
that fieldwork is perhaps the most significant technique of
16
anthropological research. Yet, some renowned anthropologists 
have done little if any real fieldwork:. Edward Taylor and 
Marcel Mauss are examples. Why then is fieldwork considered 
so essential? (Not, certainly, to satisfy requirements of 
rites of passage.) Actually, its practice fulfills many 
requisites in anthropology; I will examine two of them. ”Per- 
:haps the most important benefit derived from field work in an 
exotic locale is the sense of perspective it develops in the 
field worker” (Fried, 1972:123). This is realized/in his 
ability to view the subject culture with a higher degree of 
objectivity than he would his own culture. This objectivity 
is made possible only as a result of unfamiliarity, for in 
vieuring one’s own culture almost everything is taken for 
granted. Even the most ardent radicals within a society ac­
cept most of its cultural content without questions.
Secondly, in the field the anthropologist grasps the real 
significance of ’’cultural shock,” Fried (1972:124) writes 
that
one of the great benefits of this kind of shock 
to the anthropologist is that it makes him sen- 
tiently aware of culture, alert to the minutest 
variations and to subtle links between newly 
experienced institutions and freshly observed 
behavior.
The anthropologist’s own ideas of what constitutes customary 
(conforming) behavior may be in error.
Understanding cultural shock is extremely vital to the 
prospective fieldworker and is perhaps the essential element
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of what is referred to as the "rite of passage" for the ini­
tiate. In fact, an anthropologist's complete comprehension 
of an alien culture may be acutely related to his very sur­
vival.. While ethnocentrism is a major barrier to overcome, 
a realization that differences between cultures exist is only 
the initial impact. Bock sees cultural shock as occurring 
when direct exposure to an alien culture produces a feeling . 
of disorientation and helplessness. His description of this 
phenomenon is very graphic (1970 : ix-x) :
In general, the more "exotic" the alien society 
and the deeper one’s immersion in its social 
life, the greater the shock. The outstanding 
features of cultural shock include inability to 
make any sense out of the behavior of others or 
to predict what they will say or do. , One's 
customary categories of experience are no 
longer useful, and habitual actions elicit seem­
ingly bizarre responses. A friendly gesture 
may be treated as a threat, whereas a serious 
and sensible question provokes laughter or un­
comprehending silence. For a brief time, the 
novelty of the situation may be pleasant or 
amusing. But the person subject to extreme cul­
tural shock is often unsure whether he has gone 
mad or whether all the people around him are 
crazy - perhaps both! Even the experience of 
not understanding the language that is being 
spoken at a social gathering can be extremely 
disturbing, and the fact that others are com­
municating with evident ease does not help one's 
own situation. Add to this the need to satisfy 
some pressing biological need or social impera­
tive, and you begin to comprehend the meaning of 
cultural shock.
Kessler sees cultural shock occurring in sequences of a 
cyclical nature (1974:17-18):
On entering a strange culture, one is sharply ” 
aware of unfamiliar sounds, smells, tastes, and 
behaviors. Things seem to be unlike any we have
18
earlier experienced. One can find few patterned 
regularities, and many things might initially 
seem remarkably unpleasant. Often, the anthro­
pologist is so overwhelmed by these differences 
that he despairs of surviving, let alone accom­
plishing his work. . . . There is nothing one 
can grasp as familiar, and it is frightening.
Customs and habits are different. The shock of 
an American mother watching a French child 
drink wine can only be matched by that of a 
Chinese mother watching an American drink milk.
To the Chinese, milk is an excretion of the cow 
and is not potable. All this adds up to a feel­
ing of such instability that it is best described 
by the term "shock.”
The second stage in culture shock is a grad­
ual realization that some of these strange cus­
toms are quite comfortable. This applies most 
readily to the siesta in hot climates, or nude 
bathing, or sleeping in a hammock instead of a 
bed. One begins to. see some sense in the local 
customs and begins to use them. It is at this 
point that the stranger starts to make a judg­
ment. Often, he finds the life of the people 
he is visiting so comfortable that they become 
"his" people, like the squaw-man of the American 
frontier who found comfort in the Indian way of 
life and consciously chose to follow it. Others, 
returning to their own cultures, retain a special 
fondness for the place and people they visited 
and find the return home something of a readjust­
ment .
The concluding aspect of the second stage is most interesting. 
There is little discussion of this in the literature and in­
deed it seems a point worthy of investigation. Having been 
associated with the military during wartime, I am struck with 
the high degree of apparent similarity to battle shock, and 
in another realm, problems soldiers who have been in combat 
have in readjusting to a peacetime environment.
If we accept the need for participant observation, in 
anthropology and recognize the obligations inherent therein,
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the necessity for fully comprehending.the emotional impact 
cultural shock wi11 have upon the anthropologist becomes 
essential.
In this perspective, the rite of passage assumes, for. 
the anthropologist, a' far more significant role than merely 
denoting a transition in status. It signifies his adapt­
ability to an alien environment and an acceptance and under­
standing of cultural differences. It is this understanding 
of cultural differences, or rather a realization of the in­
compatibility of ethnocentrism with the purpose of anthro­
pological investigation, that underlies any effort to perform 
comparative studies in anthropology. This tenet is essential 
and receives repeated attention throughout this paper.
In essence, the participant observer strives to integrate 
himself into the culture he is studying. This more often than 
not entails repeated frustration, due in part to language bar­
riers (should these exist) and the anthropologist’s being con­
sidered an alien. The time it takes to obtain acceptance will 
vary, and to some degree is dependent upon the anthropologist 
himself. However, these are initial problems and once sur­
mounted lay bare fundamental methodological ones.
There exists a need for systematic research and the need 
to understand and record the culture as it is, in fact, prac­
ticed. Cohen and Naroll warn that members of the host cul­
tures are not obligated to analyze and categorize their
20
experiences and cannot therefore sort their own behavior or 
responses to questions into neat packages for placement into 
filing systems or analytical frameworks,
Anthropology--unlike the physical and natural sciences 
with their many instruments--possesses no mechanical device 
with.which to take cultural measurements. Culture must be 
observed and experienced by the fieldworker. Perhaps it is 
an oversimplification to say that the field worker is to 
anthropology as the electron, microscope is to physics. The 
analogy is at least partially valid, however, and will be 
used as a point of discussion in the following chapters.
CHAPTER III
EPISTEMOLOGY
This chapter is intended solely for the purpose of pre­
senting a very brief outline of the "Scientific Method" as 
it is currently utilized in anthropology. In the concluding 
pages, I will touch upon the nature of cultural things, sketch­
ing a bias, that permeates much of our etic methodology. My 
intent here is purely descriptive.
Science, the hallmark of knowing (and to a greater ex­
tend, not knowing), has tended to divide the world's popula­
tion into two major groupings of people: scientists, those
practicing the art of infallibility, and the nonscientists, 
those practicing the art of fallibility. This tongue-in- 
cheek oversimplification has more than a germ of truth when 
applied to the layman's view of the scientific community.
In accordance with the current "standard view of science" 
there are to be found two major types of investigation: the
empirical and the nonempirical. The former attempts to de­
scribe, explain and predict occurrences in terms of the 
physical world. Statements are verified against experience 
and are valid only if substantiated by evidence which can be 
verified by our senses. The nonempirical disciplines, logic, 
and mathematics, put forward propositions whose validity lies 
outside of the realm of empirical evidence,
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For convenience, I will divide the history of scientific 
inquiry into two major periods. The classical inductivist's 
approach was once widely accepted. The crux of this approach 
was that general principles or. laws could be inductively in­
ferred from previously collected data. This dogma is con­
tained clearly in the following account by A. B. Wolfe (1924: 
.450) :1
If we try to imagine how a mind, of superhuman 
power and reach, but normal so far as the 
logical processes of its thought are concerned 
. . . would use the scientific method, the 
process would be as follows: First, all facts
would be observed and recorded* without selec­
tion or a priori guess as to their relative 
importance. Secondly, the observed and re­
corded facts would be analyzed, compared and 
classified, without hypothesis or postulates 
other than those necessarily involved in the 
logic of thought. Third, from this analysis 
of the facts generalizations would be induc­
tively drawn as to the relations, classifica- 
tory or causal, between them. Fourth, further 
research would be deductive as well as induc­
tive, employing inferences from previously 
established generalizations.
That this doctrine received widespread and prolonged 
endorsement is somewhat surprising in view of its many short­
comings. Indiscriminate collection of data implies the uni­
verse; nor can relevant data be determined by the problem. 
"Induction is sometimes conceived as a method that leads, by 
means of mechanically applicable rules, from observed facts 
to corresponding general principles" (Hempel, 1966:14). How-
^Primary source not available; copied from Hemoel (1966:
1 1 ) .
23
ever, such mechanical procedure is not possible in scientific 
inquiry. "For- - to: mention one reason-- scientific hypotheses 
and theories are usually couched in terms that do not occur 
at all in the description of the empirical findings on which 
they rest, and which they serve to explain" (Hempel, 1966:14). 
Neither do the rules of deduction afford mechanical rules of 
discovery. Rather, they specify a way of proceeding to valid 
logical conclusions.
Since hypotheses or theories cannot be derived mechani­
cally from empirical data by rules of induction or deduction, 
transition from fact to theory requires creative imagination. 
Scientific hypotheses are invented to account for data, not 
derived from them. They are, in short, guesses at underlying 
causes for empirical occurrences.
From the twentieth century perspective, the foregoing
"method of induction" appears inoperative. However, proponents
are yet active. Edmund Leach is quite emphatic in his argument
for an inductive (mathematical) model for interpretation of
kinship systems (1961:5):
Let me, repeat. Generalization is inductive; it 
consists in perceiving possible general laws in 
the circumstances of special cases; . . .  (10) I 
am interested only in discerning possible general 
patterns in the peculiar facts of particular 
ethnographies. . . . (17) Don't start off your 
argument with a lot of value loaded concepts 
which prejudice the whole issue. . . . (2 7) My 
contrary thesis is that ethnographic facts will 
be much easier to understand if we approach them 
free of all such a priori assumptions.
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Poirier, in \\rriting about the need for more facts regarding 
fossil men, notes: "this tedium, the painstaking and some­
times grim accumulation of data, is the guts of the scien­
tific endeavor" (1973:67).
The standard view of science, also known as "the method 
of hypothesis," currently has a wide following. However, it 
must be realized that there is no single method, rather many 
that conform loosely to the general principles that will be 
outlined below. Much of what anthropologists do, can be
classified within this viewpoint.
Scientific knowledge, as we have seen, is not 
arrived at by applying some inductive infer­
ence procedure to antecedently collected data, 
but rather by what is often called "the method 
of hypothesis," i .e., by inventing hypotheses 
as tentative answers to a problem under study, 
and then subjecting these to empirical test.
It will be part of such test to see whether 
the hypothesis is borne out by whatever rele­
vant findings may have been gathered before 
its formulation; an acceptable hypothesis will 
have to fit the available relevant data.
Another part of the test will consist in de­
riving new test implications from the hypothesis 
and checking these by suitable observations or 
experiments (Hempel, 1966:17-18).
There are three basic steps in the "method of hypothesis 
The initial step is formulation of hypotheses. Since the 
scope of scientific investigation must be limited, these 
hypotheses will necessarily be biased by a preconceived pur­
pose or because of selection of the data utilized in their 
formulation. However, the validity of the hypothesis is not 
found in the validity of its supporting data, but rather in
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the experiment or test wherein data plays a significant--'but 
not absolute--role.
The next step in scientific methodology is experimenta­
tion or testing. It is this element that differentiates 
science from other techniques of explanation, Bridgeman' 
maintains a conservative position (1927:7):
. . . concepts can be defined only in the range 
of actual experiment, and are undefined and 
meaningless in regions as yet untouched by 
experiment. It follows that strictly speaking 
we cannot make statements at all about regions 
as yet untouched, and that when we do make 
such statements, as we inevitably shall, we are 
making a conventionalized extrapolation of the 
looseness of which we must be fully conscious, 
and the justification of which is in the ex ­
periment of the future.
Test implications derived from hypotheses are of a con­
ditional nature. They state that under specific test condi­
tions, an outcome of a specific type will occur. Statements 
of this kind can be symbolized in the following conditional 
form: P o Q :  if a condition of the type P is realized, then
an event of the kind Q will occur. In symbolic logic, this 
is known as a conditional or material implication.
When experiment is impossible, i.e., when conditions of 
the test implication cannot be brought about by technical 
means, the hypothesis must be tested by seeking out or wait­
ing for instances where these conditions occur in the natural 
environment.
It will be noted that the function of experiment is not 
realized solely through the role of testing, but also serves
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as a technique of discovery. To illustrate, an archaeologist 
may wish to study the effect of a new flaking technique for 
stone tools. He may conjecture that this new technique greatly 
increased the sharpness of the tool (condition P ) . He would 
perform experiments to determine if' this factor does increase 
sharpness (implication Q - here, experimentation serves as a 
test) , and if so, how it effects the dependent variable 
". . . that is, just what the specific mathematical form of 
the dependence is (here, experimentation serves as a method of 
discovery)" (Hempel, 1966:21). On the basis of these results, 
he would tentatively formulate generalizations that express 
the degree of sharpness as a function of the flaking technique, 
". . . [T]est implications are 'derived or .inferred' from 
the hypothesis that is to be tested" (Hempel, 1966:22). H o w ­
ever, this is not a complete statement of the relationship 
between an hypothesis and test implications. It is possible 
to derive certain conditional statements that can serve as 
test sentences. These perform the role of auxiliary assump­
tions or auxiliary hypotheses. In these cases, we are not 
permitted to state that, if. the hypothesis is true, so then 
is the test implication, but rather only if that the hypothesis 
and the auxiliary assumptions are true, so then, will the test 
implication be true. How important this is becomes clear when- 
one attempts to disprove an hypothesis on the basis of a nega­
tive test implication. Hempel provides a good schema (1966:23)
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If H alone implies I and if empirical findings 
show I to be false, then H must also be quali­
fied as false: this follows by the modus
tollens argument. . . . But when I is derived 
from H in conjunction with one or more auxil­
iary hypothesis A, then the schema ... must 
be replaced by the following one.
If both H and A are true, then so is I 
But (as the evidence shows) I is not true.
H and A are not both true.
Thus if the test shows I to be false, we can 
infer only that either the hypothesis or one 
of the auxiliary assumptions included in A 
must be false; hence, the test provides no 
conclusive grounds for rejecting H.
. . no statement or set of statements T can be signifi­
cantly proposed as a scientific hypothesis or theory unless it 
is amenable to objective empirical test, at least 'in princi­
p l e " ’ (Hempel, 1966:30)* That is, it must be possible to de ­
rive it logically from the test implication of the form P p Q .
If a hypothesis cannot be tested, then it cannot- be considered 
as a scientific theory, since no empirical findings can con­
form or conflict with it.
The final step pertains to explanation. One of the primary 
objectives of science is to explain phenomena of the physical 
world. Man has long attempted to achieve an understanding of 
the world around him. Some of these efforts are based in meta­
physical concepts of the forces of nature. Others refer to 
supernatural powers. Still others invoke "God’s will" or 
relegate explanation to fate. Accounts of this kind provide 
answers and yield a sense of understanding. However, even if 
such explanations are psychologically acceptable to man, they
are unacceptable for the purposes of science which requires 
explanation that is capable of being objectively verified.
The fundamental element of all explanation is scientific
law. Carnap is very emphatic (1966:6):
First, let us see how laws of science are used 
for explanation. No explanation - that is, 
nothing that deserves the honorific title of 
’'explanation" - can be given without refer­
ring to at least one law.
It is generally accepted among philosophers of science 
that there are tî o types of scientific law: the universal and 
the statistical.. The former is expressed symbolically:
(X) (Px o Q x )
Pa
Qa
The initial statement, (X) (PX :»QX ), is the symbolic form of 
all universal laws that apply to any object "X". The second 
statement Pa , asserts that an object "a" has the property "P". 
Then via a rule of deductive logic, we are able to derive the 
third statement, object "a" has the property *'Q'r. This schema 
is also valid in depicting prediction when Qa is unknown. "We 
have a law, and we have the fact Pa . We conclude that Qa must 
also be a fact, even though it has not yet been observed" 
(Carnap, 1966:17). :
The second category of scientific law is known as statis­
tical. It is simply a statement of probability. For example,' 
it is reported that 70 percent of the projectile points from 
an archaeological site are made of obsidian. I know of a
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projectile point from this site, but have not seen it. I 
can infer, on the basis of statistical laws, that the prob­
ability of it being obsidian is 70 percent.
That any explanation of value in anthropology, for etic 
analysis, must make reference to or be anchored in scientific 
law is fundamental to our discipline. Generic explanations 
that provide a deeper understanding must not be confused with 
the type of explanation we seek. Our reference to general 
laws may indeed be unrealized or appear quite vague, but be 
they explicit or tacit, we are bound to their utilization.
In discussing the use of general laws in history, Hempel 
underscores the requirement for their utilization (1965:242- 
243) :
Many of the universal hypotheses underlying 
historical exploration, for instance, would 
commonly be classified as psychological, 
economical, sociological, and partly perhaps 
as historical laws; in addition, historical 
research has frequently to resort to general 
laws established in physics, chemistry and 
biology. Thus e.g., the explanation of the 
defeat of an army by reference to lack of 
food, adverse weather conditions, disease, 
and the like, is based on a - usually tacit - 
assumption of such laws. The use of tree 
rings in dating events in history rests on 
the application of certain biological regu­
larities. Various methods of testing the 
authenticity of documents, paintings, .coins, 
etc., make use of physical and chemical 
theories.
For purposes of the following discussion on the nature of 
cultural things, I will assume that the epistemological status 
of the physical sciences is sought for by a science of culture.
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This is not to say that a scientific status may be bestowed 
upon cultural studies merely by emulating the operations 
characteristic of the physical sciences. There can be found 
little or no agreement regarding proper or improper opera- 
tionalism, thus resulting in unrestricted use of different 
logical and empirical procedures. There appears to be a com­
mon desire, that of obtaining operational purity. That this 
becomes a fiction, is illustrated by Harris (1964:6):
Dependence upon primitive terms is by no means 
the weakest aspect of operationalism, conceived 
in its narrowest sense. When the operational 
point of view is pressed to its limit of termi­
nological precision and clarity, it fails utterly 
to provide a practical basis for scientific com­
munication. Bridgman's early dictum, "The con­
cept is synonymous with the corresponding set of 
operations" (1927:5), cannot, if literally inter­
preted, serve as a working model for anything 
resembling normal scientific activity, even in 
the physical sciences. A data language con­
structed out of terms introduced in the above 
fashion would guarantee intersubjectdve objec­
tivity, but virtually eliminate intersubjective 
communication. Every word in the data language 
would stand for a nicely defined operation, but 
every operation would call for a different word. 
Communication would, in effect, consist of an 
ever-expanding array of proper nouns about which 
it would be impossible to make relational or 
connective statements.
If we are to concern ourselves with empiricism in the sub­
ject of our scientific discourse, cultural things must be con­
sidered as constructs of what the anthropologist observes.
"This is so because no two operations and hence no two things 
can ever be shown through empirical operation alone to.be pre­
cisely identical" (Harris, 1964:6); however, we can demonstrate
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their uniqueness.
If we accept that no two cultural things are identical 
and science must not be predicated on a doctrine of unique­
ness (since theories and hypotheses are statements of inter­
relationships), we are led to accept a methodology based upon 
dealing with abstractions^ Entailed therein is the necessity 
of establishing arbitrary classifications, categories, and 
systems. These classifications must be based upon similarities. 
Nor is this a contradiction: for, while identicals do not exist 
in an empirical world, they do exist in a purely logical realm. 
’’Whenever sameness is applied in the context of operationally 
valid macro-entities, it only means that, according to some 
metrical standard, two readings on a measuring device do not 
differ by more than a specified amount” (Harris, 1964:8)..
While there may exist natural units of things, one can be 
no more natural than another. Implicit in a notion that there 
are natural units is a belief that a given unit is temporally 
and spacially continuous with itself and at the same time dis­
continuous with everything else. ”The natural units of science, 
and of ordinary discourse are essentially customary devices 
which cannot be justified on purely logical grounds" (Harris, 
1964:12). Thus the anthropologist considering cultural traits 
cannot consider one more natural than another.
Assuming there are no natural units, how does the scien­
tist divide his data into classes? As indicated above, the
logical rules of induction or deduction do not serve to indi­
cate which operation to choose or what range of variation to 
specify, rather they can only point to the necessity for as­
certaining similarities from which the universe must be 
narrowed in terms of operation and variation. "A particular 
mode of classification is good or bad depending upon the kinds 
of results which can be achieved with it. If the classifica­
tion reveals orderly relations it is a good classification; 
if it reveals nothing but chaos it is worthless" (Harris, 
1964:14). In essence, there are no predetermined classifica­
tions. It is left entirely to the prerogative of the individ­
ual to formulate those best suited for his study.- The only 
real guides are teleological and pragmatic principles of 
scientific inquiry.
CHAPTER IV
THEORETICAL GENERALIZATIONS 
Emic and Etic
Description in the empirical sciences has always played 
a fundamental role. During the formative (inductivistic) 
years, dating from Aristotle until about the beginning of 
the twentieth century, it was virtually the only legitimate 
"scientific" activity. Then as posltivistic doctrines gained 
eminence, description served the inductive model in the role 
of test verification. No longer was it acceptable to make 
purely superficial description of things observed. The thrust 
of description was directed toward operational terminology; 
e.g., ethnographic reports once described a newly married 
couple as going to live in the proximity of the female's 
family. This type of residence is now; known as matrilocal.
In other words, description serves to establish the boundaries 
of technical definitions but is at the same time grounded in 
the data from which it is derived.
Many cultural phenomena do not readily lend themselves 
to observation and measurement by instruments of technology; 
rather it is the individual anthropologist, functioning as a 
participant observer, who serves this role. It is his eyes
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and other senses and brain that together observe, record, 
measure, and analyze culture. In essence, the initial func­
tion of anthropological observation is description.
In terms of current anthropological terminology (appro­
priated from linguistics), descriptions occur in two dif­
ferent realms -- the emic and the etic. It is also appropriate 
that these terms eimbody two rather distinct philosophies. 
Throughout the ensuing discussion it must be remembered that 
it is only the participant observer, or the analyst, who can 
view culture from both the emic and etic plateaus, because by 
being an alien a sense of perspective is developed that permits 
escape from emic entanglements.
From an undated manuscript by Curry, we are afforded a
brief historical review of this methodology (n.d«:7):
The neologisms of ''emic1' and "etic" are analogues 
drawn from the words phonemic and phonetic.
"Phones" are merely classes of sound without 
meaning. Phonetics is the study of such classes, 
and phonology is the study of the production of 
sound by the vocal apparatus. A phoneme, though, 
is on the "meaning" side of the linguistic ledger, 
and, by definition, a "phoneme" is the smallest 
unit of sound entering into a relationship with 
meaning. Many years ago Pike took the sound- 
without-meaning ending of phonetic and used it 
to refer to descriptions of human behavior, both 
• verbal and non-verbal, made by observers without 
reference to the meanings attributed~~to their own 
behavior by the participants. Likewise, he took 
the sound-with-meaning ending of phonemic and 
used it to refer to descriptions of human behavior, 
both verbal and non-verbal, which utilized the 
meanings attributed to their own behavior by the
participants.
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Many attempts have been made to describe the emic pro­
cess. Sapir grapples with the problem through analogy (1949: 
456-457):
It is impossible to say what an individual is 
doing unless we have tacitly accepted the es­
sentially arbitrary modes of interpretation 
that social tradition is constantly suggesting 
to us from the very moment of our birth. Let 
anyone who doubts this try the experiment of 
making a painstaking report of the actions of 
a group of natives engaged in some form of 
activity, say religious, to which he has not 
the cultural key. If he is a skillful writer, 
he may succeed in giving a picturesque account 
of what he sees and hears, or thinks he sees 
and hears, but the chance of his being able to 
give a relation of x^hat happens, in terms that 
would be acceptable to the natives themselves 
are practically nil. He xtfill be guilty of all 
manner of distortion. His emphasis will be 
constantly askew. He will find interesting 
what the natives take for granted as a casual 
kind of behavior worthy of no particular com- 
. ment, and he will utterly fail to observe the 
crucial turning points in the course of action 
that give formal significance to the whole in 
the minds of those who do possess the key to 
its understanding.
Later Harris presents a behaviorist interpretation (1968:571):
Emic statements refer to logico-empirical systems 
whose phenomenal distinctions or "things” are 
built up out of contrasts and discriminations 
significant, meaningful, real, accurate, or in 
some other fashion regarded as appropriate by 
the actors themselves. An emic statement can 
be falsified if it can be shown that it con­
tradicts the cognitive calculus by which rele­
vant actors judge that entities are similar or 
different, real, meaningful, significant, or in 
some other sense "appropriate" or "acceptable."
Perhaps Geertz's comments regarding "experience-near" 
(emic) and in passing "experience^distant" (etic) phenomena 
are most illuminating of all (1975:48):
Putting the matter this way - in terms of how 
anthropological analysis is to be conducted 
and its results framed, rather than what physi­
cal constitution anthropologists need to have - 
reduces the mystery of what ’’seeing things 
from the native's point of view" means. But it 
does not make it any easier nor does it lessen 
the demand for perceptiveness on the part of 
the fieldworker. To grasp concepts x^hich, for 
another people are experience-near, and to do 
so well enough to place them in illuminating 
connection with those experience-distant con­
cepts that theorists have fashioned to capture 
the general features of social life, is clearly 
a task at least as delicate, if a bit less 
magical, as putting oneself into someone else's 
skin. The trick is not to achieve some inner 
correspondence of spirit with your informants; 
perferring, like the rest of us, to call their 
souls their own, they are not going to be alto­
gether keen about such an effort anyhow. The 
trick is to figure out what the devil they 
think they are up to. . . . People use exper-. 
ience-near concepts spontaneously, unself­
consciously, as it were, colloquially; they 
do not, except fleetingly and on occasion, 
recognize that there are any "concepts" in-.
, volved at all. That is what experience-near 
means - that ideas and the realities they dis­
close are naturally and indissolubly bound up 
together. What else could you call a hippo­
potamus? Of course the gods are powerful; why 
else would we fear them? The ethnographer 
does not, and in my opinion, laregly cannot, 
perceive what his informants perceive. What he 
perceives - and that uncertainly enough - is 
xvhat they perceive "with," or "by means of," or 
" t h r o u g h "  or whatever word one may choose. In 
the country of the blind, who are not as unob­
servant as they appear, the one-eyed is not king 
but spectator.
Only toward the end of the emic process does the partici­
pant observer begin to comprehend fully the emic statements 
and structures. The term "emic" embodies a process of accul­
turation. The participant observer seeks to see things from
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the natives- point of view. He seeks "verstehen” (to use a 
sociological term). The philosopher would say it is seeking 
an Understanding rather than an understanding of. It is 
during this process of Understanding that the participant 
observer encounters the phenomenon of cultural shock.
What begins initially as a search metaphorically for an 
intuitive Understanding later becomes a search for structures 
and classifications. These tentative classifications are emic 
in nature and derive their objectivity from description of 
Understanding. While these folk taxonomies have significance,
it is of a kind that prohibits transfer from the observer to
other researchers, since it is a personal insight. Nor do 
these emic structures, by themselves, lead to objective analy­
sis as required by science, because they are merely a series 
of interrelationships that have no cohesion other than that 
supplied by the observer. While the participant observer may 
undertake a totally emic study, the resultant findings will 
have no empirical foundation. Bessac affords us a unique 
insight (1971:69):
A description given in emic terms can at the
best be based upon a few folk taxonomies about
which the ethnographer feels secure - the 
remainder of the ethnography will be based 
upon analogy - the etic taxonomies must ulti­
mately derive from the orientation of the dis­
cipline.
With the foregoing introduction to the etic, let us pro­
ceed with a discussion thereof. Pike designates some of the 
salient characteristics (1967:37):
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The etic viewpoint studies behavior as from out­
side of a particular system. . . . (1967:38)
Descriptions or analyses from the etic standpoint 
are ’’alien" in view, with criteria external to 
the system. . . . The etic criteria may often be 
considered absolute, or measurable directly. . . .
The etic view does not require that every unit be 
viewed as a part of a larger setting.
Harris quotes from an earlier publication by Pike - unavailable
to me at this date (1964:138):
An etic analytical standpoint . . . might be 
called "external" or "alien" since for etic 
purposes the analyst stands "far enough away from" 
or "outside" of a particular culture to see its 
separate events, primarily in relation to their 
similarities and their differences, as compared 
to the events of other cultures, rather than in 
reference to the sequences of classes of events 
within that one particular culture.
This taxonomic undertaking is one of seeking absolutes 
within the range of sensitivity of the measuring instrument.
It is an ordering of understanding - that understanding whose 
end is control. . .
Etic taxonomies are derived from the scientific subculture , 
of the participant observer, which may or may not be similar 
to that of the subject culture. They are empirical structures, 
derived from a positivistic doctrine. However, while the etic 
may be derived from an alien culture it must be emphasized 
that its application is conditioned by the subject culture.
Like the emic, a wholly etic description of culture can­
not be successfully developed. Any attempt to do so will re­
sult in unacceptable distortion and misinterpretation.. Where 
the emic in its final stages is to a great extent dependent
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upon the etic for unification, the etic, in its initial 
stages, is dependent upon the emic for direction. Seemingly 
any creditable ethnology should comprise both the emic and 
etic. It is through this dual approach that cross cultural 
or comparative studies find validity.
The following comment by Geertz is instructive (1975:48):
Clearly the matter is one of degree, not polar 
opposition: "fear” is experience-nearer than 
"phobia," and "phobia" experience-nearer than 
"ego dyssyntonic." And the difference is not, 
at least so far as anthropology is concerned 
(the matter is otherwise in poetry and physics), 
a normative one, in the sense that one sort of 
concept as such is to be preferred over the 
other. Confinement to experience-near concepts 
leaves an ethnographer awash in immediacies as 
well as entangled in vernacular. Confinement 
to experience-distant ones leaves him stranded 
in abstractions and smothered in jargon.
There exist many methodologies in anthropology today; 
Historical Reconstruction, Associational, Functional, Evolu­
tional and Systems Analysis, to name a few of the more promi­
nent. In.an effort to demonstrate the integration of emic and 
etic approaches in general methodology, I propose to look 
briefly at two approaches, aspects of which appear fundamental 
to all, the Historical Reconstruction and Functional - Evolu­
tionism /notwithstanding.
Diachronic
Certainly anyone having even only a passing acquaintance 
with American anthropology will acknowledge Franz Boas'
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patriarchal status in the Historical Reconstruction method.
Not only were his contributions profound, but his academic 
background would seemingly lend Credence to his acceptance 
as a philosopher of science. That he did not formally con­
tribute to this endeavor does not negate his comprehension 
thereof. His professional writings evidence a farsighted­
ness not appreciated either in his time, or to some extent, 
today.
During his first field experience (1883-1884) - the 
Baffinland expedition - he not only came to realize ". . . 
the compelling idea of his life's x^ork: the complete molding 
of every human expression - inner thought and external be ­
havior - by social conditioning" (Spier 1959:146); but also 
the essential requirement for fieldwork.. At that time field 
work was more often than not cursory. Two of the most promi­
nent anthropologists of the time, E. B, Tylor and Lewis H. 
Morgan, were for the most part "armchair" anthropologists, 
relying upon the reports of missionaries, adventurers, sailors 
and travelers for "facts" upon which to base their anthropo­
logical theories.
Evidence obtained from fieldwork unveiled many short­
comings in the works of these "armchair" anthropologists.
In chapter 5, I review the works of Lewis H. Morgan whose 
lack of fieldworlc. seriously impaired his efforts. As a 
result of this demonstrated need to perform fieldwork, the
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method of participant observation is derived. It is certainly 
one of the primary contributions of the Historical Reconstruc- 
tionists to anthropological methodology.
Perhaps the most popular indictment of Boas is his seem­
ing obsession with data collection. It has been charged that 
Boas attempted to approach anthropological data in terms of 
the narrow inductivist doctrine (chapter 2). Almost without 
exception, a finger is directed toward his work with the 
Kwakiutl and the work of his students, with the indictment 
that their reports are merely a collection of random facts, 
unrelated and therefore, unusable today. However, while the 
nature of these studies was basically salvage (not unlike 
those in salvage archaeology) the true significance of Boas f 
work can best be understood when viewed in terms of the emic 
approach.
Boas believed that it was essential to know the history 
of a cultural phenomenon before any meaningful study could 
be undertaken. He also believed it important to understand 
the meaning the element had for the people being studied.
If two rituals have different histories, then they must be 
different regardless of how similar they appear. Both their 
functions and evolution are different, A reconstruction of 
historical development is the essential element of Diachronic 
studies. This reconstruction is also in essence an emic en­
deavor since the purpose is substantially one of ascertaining
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culture particular meaning. Thus, instead of evaluating these 
emic endeavors in terms of etic standards, they must be ac­
cepted for what they are, attempts to understand the particu­
lar elements of a culture in terms of that culture's perspec­
tives. I believe that it is not an overstatement to attribute 
to Boas recognition of the essentiality of an emic approach 
preceding etic taxonomies; and he must be accorded recognition 
as one of the first to insist on its utilization in fieldwork.. 
As stated by Boas (1943:314):
In natural sciences we are accustomed to demand 
a classification of phenomena expressed in con­
cise and unambiguous terminology. The same 
term should have the same meaning everywhere.
We should like to see the same in anthropology.
As long as we do not overstep the limits of one 
culture we are able to classify its features in 
a clear and definite terminology. We know what 
we mean by the terms family, state, government, 
etc. As soon as we overstep the limits of one 
culture we do not know in how far these may cor­
respond to equivalent concepts. If we choose 
to apply our classification to alien cultures 
we may combine forms that do not belong together 
and separate what belongs together. The very 
rigidity of definition may lead to a misunder­
standing of the essential problems involved.
. . . If it is our serious purpose to understand 
the thoughts of a people the whole analysis of 
experience must be based on their concepts, not 
ours.
Concerning etic phenomena, Boas held an unfailing convic­
tion that for purposes of analysis it was absolutely essential 
to reconstruct the history of the subject culture. This is 
evidenced throughout his work. "As a matter of fact all his­
tory of primitive people that any ethnologist has ever
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developed is reconstruction and cannot be anything else"
(Boas, 1936:140). That this history will be fragmented and 
often undeterminable was realized. However, he argued that 
only through assimilation of data can it ever be done. But 
once these limitations are recognized, it becomes possible 
to define a method whose application, though no doubt limited 
in scope by the exceptionally unfavorable conditions under 
which the anthropologist works, may still yield valid find­
ings. "A detailed study of customs in their relation to the 
total culture of the tribe practicing them in connection with 
an investigation of their geographical distribution among 
neighboring tribes, affords us almost always a means of deter­
mining with considerable accuracy the historical causes that 
led to the formation of the customs in question and to the 
psychological processes that were at work in their develop­
ment" (Boas, 1940:276).
A further condition of reconstruction is that research 
should be confined to small areas with definite boundaries.
Any comparisons should not extend beyond the area of study.
We are cautioned against accepting recurrence of similar cus­
toms or institutions as proof of contact. "We shall probably 
never achieve chronological certainty, but it is possible to 
obtain high probabilities with reference to phenomena, or 
groups of phenomena, of limited distribution in time and 
space" (Levi~Straussv 1967:7),
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The very fragmentary nature of history points to an in­
herent danger for employing evolutionary concepts beyond the 
limits of demonstrated history. Levi-Strauss formulates a 
fundamental argument. (1967:7-8):
Can we draw the conclusion that one type has 
evolved from the other? For such a hypothesis 
to be legitimate we should have to be, able to 
prove that one type is more primitive than the 
other; that the more primitive type evolves 
necessarily toward the other form; and finally* 
that this law operates more rigorously in the 
center of the region than at its periphery.
Failing this threefold and impossible demon­
stration, any theory of survivals is futile, 
and in this particular case the facts support 
no reconstruction tending, for example, to 
assert the historical priority of matrilineal 
over patrilineal institutions.
In conclusion it is necessary to illuminate the paradox 
that is inherent in the reconstruction method--dictated by 
the very scientific aim and universal scope Boas introduced 
into anthropology from physics. Boas sought to apply rigorous 
methodology from the natural sciences to a subjective world 
(Spier, 1959). "Knowledge of social facts must be based on 
induction from individualized and concrete knowledge of social 
groups localized in time and space" (Levi-Strauss, 1967:9).
Such knowledge can be obtained only from a history of the 
subject culture. However, the nature of ethnological subject 
matter very often lies beyond the reach of history, Thus 
Boas rests his techniques of operational verification upon 
a shaky and at times nonexistent historical framework. It 
was the nature of the extremely stringent criteria of verifica­
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tion that Boas brought with him from physics that caused this 
dilemma. His requirements were so stringent that they were 
virtually impossible to meet. Recently, there have been at­
tempts to loosen these criteria of verifiability.
In the integrated emic and etic approach, which is one 
of the more salient aspects of participant observation, the 
historical reconstruction method establishes as a fundamental 
requirement the ascertainment of historical data relative to 
that culture being studied. Since every culture will have- a 
different history, although at times appearing quite similar 
to another, it is essential to know these differences in order 
to make comparative studies. H. K. Haeberlin (1916) ably 
demonstrates, in his article "The Idea of Fertilization in 
the Culture of the Pueblo Indian," how a single ceremony, 
virtually identical in all overt respects, performed by two 
different groups has two entirely different interpretations. 
Without a detailed history of the ceremony as it appears in 
each group, comparative studies would be misrepresentative. 
Historical reconstruction is the basic tool by which differ­
ences are identified and rendered intelligible for compara­
tive analysis. Anthropology is a discipline dedicated to 
studying differences rather than similarities.
On a more elementary level, in that it has a profound 
personal impact upon the anthropologist, historical recon­
struction allows the often traumatic experience of culture
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shock to attain cognitive relevancy. Without the understand­
ing of the underlying history of a phenomenon found to be 
alien, the anthropologist would find it virtually impossible 
to adjust to the new situation. For, indeed, he would have 
nothing upon which to base his response and would be adrift 
in a sea of reactions.
Synchronic
The Functional school has tended to recognize either 
Malinowski or Radcliffe-Brown as its patriarch. The Func­
tionalists renounced the need for understanding history in 
favor of studying cultures in terms of relationships between 
their constituent elements. The fundamental tenet of the 
Functional school is that a penetrating analysis of a culture 
can be achieved without knowledge of the history underlying 
current patterns.
Least some confusion incur, I hasten to add that the 
British Functionalists tended to ignore the American schools, 
instead focusing their attention upon the works of such indi­
viduals as Fraizer and the German diffusionists. In chapter 5 
I briefly review the basic position of the German diffusion­
ists as presented by Fritz Graebner. Thus the ensuing criti­
cisms expounded by the functionalists were not necessarily 
directed across the ocean, rather toward the historism ad­
vocated by European diffusionists.
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Initially, Functionalism would appear to be a fruitful 
approach: one stops the wheels of time (so to speak) and
makes a purely contemporary inquiry into the interrelation­
ships of different cultural elements. However, as Levi- 
Strauss (1967:12-13) points out, is this not to fall victim 
to an illusion?
For everything is history: What was said yes­
terday is history, what was said a minute ago 
is history. But, above all, one is led to 
misjudge the present, because only the study 
of historical development permits the weigh­
ing and evaluation of the interrelationships 
among the components of the present-day 
society. And a little history - since such, 
unfortunately is the lot of the anthropolo­
gist - is better than no history at all.
Flow shall we correctly- estimate the role, 
so surpi'ising to foreigners, of the aperitif 
in French social life if we are ignorant of 
the traditional prestige value ascribed to 
cooked and spiced wines ever since the Middle 
Ages ?
While the Functionalists purport to embrace both the 
emic and etic, their disdain of history seriously impairs any 
emic understanding of persisting patterns (often unconscious).
An analogy can be found in Boas' linguistic studies. He 
stated,
the essential difference between linguistic 
phenomena and other ethnological phenomena is, 
that the linguistic classifications never rise 
to consciousness, while in other ethnological 
phenomena, although the same unconscious origin 
prevails, these often rise into consciousness, 
and thus give rise to secondary reasoning and 
to reinterpre.tations. (1911:67),
1Primary source not available to me; copied from Levi- 
Strauss (1967:20).
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History can be equated to the structure of language in that a 
native need not know the history of his culture to have an 
emic understanding of it, just as he need not know the struc­
ture of his language to carry on discourse, Malinowski would 
also exclude
. . . any comparative data borrowed from 
neighboring or remote societies. . . .  He 
does this in order not to spoil the wonder­
ful intuition that will enable him to grasp 
eternal truths on the nature and function 
of social institutions through an abstract 
dialogue with his little tribe. (Levi- 
Strauss, 1967:12).
In terms of the etic, we seem to be faced with a tautology, 
saying a society functions; i.e., the widest generalizations 
found in a study of cultural integration are commonplace. We 
are told that the institution of gardening ". . . is univer­
sally found wherever the environment is favorable to cultiva­
tion of the soil and the level of culture sufficiently high 
to allow it” (Malinowski, 1935:625). But what have we really 
learned about this institution or about the outrigger canoe 
when we are informed that it is a vessel whose n . . . arrange­
ment gives the greatest stability, seaworthiness and manage­
ability, considering the limitations in material and in tech­
nical handicraft of the Oceanic cultures" (Malinowski, 1935: 
627)? ;
With regard to general characteristics, it is the task 
of the participant observer to describe and analyze the dif­
ferent manifestations within his subject culture. Later, when
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returning from the field and studying them, he seeks to explain 
them. For example, the participant observer seeks to describe 
and analyze marriage rules and customs. However, Malinowski
2contradicts this objective as an end in itself (1934:48-49):
To put it bluntly, I should say that the sym­
bolic, representative or ceremonial contents 
of marriage are of secondary importance to the 
anthropologist. . . . The real essence of the 
marriage act is that by means of an extremely 
simple or highly complicated ceremony it gives 
public, tribally recognized, expression to the 
fact that two individuals enter the state of 
marriage.
Along the same line of thought, do we accept insuring the 
permanence of marriage as the single function of either or 
both premarital sexual freedom and chastity? What is of con­
cern to the ethnologist is not the universality of the func­
tion, but that it is so varied. Levi-Strauss has issued a 
profound indictment C1967114):
It is true that a discipline whose main, if 
not sole, aim is to analyze and interpet dif­
ferences evades all problems when it takes into 
account only similarities. But at the same 
time it thus loses the means of distinguish­
ing between the general truths to which it 
aspires and the trivialities with which it 
must be satisfied.
We must acknowledge Malinowski his due as a good partici­
pant observer for indeed he survived his cultural shock and 
evidenced an understanding of the emic. However, it is the 
opinion of this writer that the broad generalizations proposed
yPrimary source not available to me; copied from Levi 
Strauss (1967:14).
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by many proponents of the functional approach serve to make 
all human culture a derivative, or at times a reflection of, 
a particular subject culture. Thus, in the instance of 
Malinowski, the Trobriand Islands serve him as the cultural 
center for his synchronic studies.
There is in functional analysis another shortcoming. 
Several members of the logical positivist school maintain 
that fimctional statements are unscientific assertions be ­
cause they can neither be confirmed or disconfirmed. The 
argument runs that it is impossible to demonstrate whether 
the function of an institution would fail if the institution 
were removed. However, as Cohen argues:
The real difficulty here is that, testable or 
not, sociocultural reality and actors ̂in̂ - 
society are purposive in at least some of their 
actions. Furthermore, actions very often have 
consequences, and environments do limit the 
conditions of action if they do not, in some 
cases, determine them outright. The attack on 
functionalism, then, is relevant only when a 
researcher decides that everything must serve 
a purpose, if not now, then at some previous 
time (1970:40).
Thus functional analysis would appear to be valid if evidence 
is given to unite an action with its result in a purposive 
way. It is not enough to say that "An functions to carry 
out the purpose "P"; rather we must supply evidence to the 
existence of such a relationship. This, unfortunately, is 
not always done. An example is contained on the preceding 
page in the quotation by Malinowski regarding the marriage 
ceremony.
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Both the Diachronic and Synchronic undertake a basically 
emic and etic approach. But h-ere the similarity ends. In 
the Diachronic, the anthropologist seeks understanding in 
terms of history. A society’s history gives him an insight 
by which to describe and analyze current observations. The 
Synchronic would have the anthropologist derive his under-
s
standing via inductive means. From this he seeks to gen­
eralize his observations. On the etic level: Diachronic 
studies seek to limit their scope to single societies, 
foregoing conclusions about other regions; the Synchronic 
approach holds that observation of a single society makes it 
possible to understand universals.
CHAPTER V
PROGRAMMED OBSERVATION VERSUS HANGING LOOSE
In the preceding chapter we briefly reviewed two anthro­
pological methods and demonstrated how both incorporated the 
participant observer techniques as a fundamental aspect of 
their respective methodologies. My intent in this chapter 
is to pursue etic analysis and demonstrate the shortcomings 
of an investigation that seeks, consciously, to avoid pre­
liminary emic studies. I have chosen a prominent anthropol­
ogist for this purpose.
Marvin Harris is an eminent anthropologist whose extreme 
idealism entraps him in an ethnocentric-like position similar 
to that of other behaviorists. Harris employs an intricate 
system of abstraction levels in which cultures can be etically 
analyzed.
As seen in chapter 2, the basic tenets for etically 
analyzing culture in terms of abstractions are well-founded. 
Proceeding upon this fundamental premise, Harris undertakes 
to limit his field of inquiry: . *'. . . 1  shall assert .that 
human behavior constitutes the cultural field of inquiry.
By human behavior,. I mean the gross changes of state which 
the body parts of human beings exhibit’* (1964:20). Human
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behavior is viewed as an uninterruptable stream of body part 
motions. It is the job of the anthropologist to break the 
behavior stream into pieces whose recurrences will lead to 
prediction.
Harris's definition of the behavior stream in terms of 
body part motions is essential to his position, for he must 
identify some element that is common to all cultures. This 
universal element is the anatomical motions which the actors 
themselves create. It must be realized at the onset that 
Harris has no interest in the emic meaning of the action.
All of his taxonomy is oriented to dismissing this area of 
investigation.
Having defined his area of study, Harris begins to erect 
his scaffold. The smallest aspect of culture is an actone 
which ” . ... . is a behavioral bit consisting of body motion 
and environmental effect which rise above the threshold of 
the observer’s auditory and visual senses” (1964:37). An 
actone takes an action form which is verbalized as carry, 
drop, pull, and push, for examples. However, they are quite 
imprecise and require modification as far as precisely defin­
ing what the.motion has been. Thus he defines the above 
mentioned actones as follows (1964:47):
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ACTONEME BODY PART BODY MOTION ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECT
carry hand hand moves object moves
horizontally horizontally
while fingers 
grasp
drop fingers fingers open object falls
pull hand hand moves object moves toward
toward actor body
while fingers 
grasp
push hand hand moves 
away from 
body with
object moves away 
from body
fingers open
An actone is a class of responses that occurs repeatedly 
throughout the world and can thus effectively become the lowest 
meaningful universal common denominator of human behavior.
Since there are literally millions of actones present in 
the behavior stream of any one culture, it would be impossible 
for a single ethnologist to record all of them. "Recourse to 
a second or third observer and to motion picture cameras and 
tape recorders will solve part of this problem" (1964:45). In 
short, it is the units of cultural behavior that have rele­
vancy and no effort should be spared to record them.
The second level of abstraction is entitled "episodes," 
which are supra-actone regularities. All episodes occur in 
conjunction with four stage coordinates (actor-type, object- 
type, place and time). The purpose of these coordinates is 
to permit location of the episode on a temporal and spatial 
grid as well as setting the stage, so to speak. "The defini­
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tion of an episode as an actone for which four stage coordi­
nates have been supplied corresponds roughly to supplying 
answers to the questions, who, what, when and where" (Harris, 
1964:70) .
The actor-type coordinate identifies who emitted the 
actone. The most profitable way to deal with this coordinate 
for classification is to consider the actor (individual) as a 
member of a class. Harris distinguishes two types of classes:
(1) An actor may be identified by placing him 
in a class of actors based upon the fact that 
all members of .the class perform some episode 
or higher-order unit of behavior in common.
(2) An actor may be identified by referring 
to some nonbehavioral biological feature or 
relationship which the actor shares in com­
mon with other actors (1964:55).
The first group is ". . identified by classing together
actors who emit similar actones involving similar object types,
at similar times and places" (1964:55). The second class is
identified by those physical differences between human beings
(e.g., sex, age, body build, hair color, etc.).
Object-types are those classes of things that are moved
or transferred by the body motion of the actor. These are
the material things of a culture, but include all natural
things (snow, rocks, trees, dogs, horses, etc.) and those
things refined by human behavior. For the most part, this
coordinate serves the purpose of scene setting, answering
the question, "What?”
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Place refers to a definite geographical point where the 
episode occurs. These places may be absolute, appearing on 
a terrestrial grid. They may be relative in nature (place- 
objects) such as a car, subway, church, desk, bathroom, etc. 
Regardless of the type of place, every episode occurs at a 
definite point on a spatial grid and answers the question, 
"Where?".
Time, the fourth coordinate, locates the episode on a 
temporal grid and satisfies inquiries regarding, "When?"
"Our concern need not be focused upon absolute chronology, 
but may instead locate an event in time by relating it to 
some recurrent events of a cyclical sort" (Harris, 1964:68- 
69). That is to say, we may locate the episode in an absolute 
sense (hour of the day, month, year,, etc.) or in a relative 
sense as occurring during high tide, monsoon season, or year 
of the drought.
Before leaving this second level of abstraction let us 
see how Harris fits the actone together with stage coordinates 
to create an episode: . . Sunday mornings (time) a class
of actors (actor-type) pick up (actone) a chalice (actone 
object) in church (place-type). Following the vernacular 
lead, let us call this class of actors, priests" (1964:55).
In this episode the actor-type is of a behavioral class and 
the actone is modified by the actone object.
Episodes may occur as isolated events, but when they do, 
they are of no real interest to the anthropologist. Moving
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upward to the third level of abstraction, we encounter episode 
chains which are continuous sequences of episodes. An example 
of an episode chain is given by Harris as he recounts the 
specific episodes of his wife preparing fried potatoes for 
the evening meal. What is important is not the isolated event 
of his wife preparing the potatoes in the manner in which she 
did but . . whether or not the enumerated idio* episodes- are 
in some sense repeated by other actors. That portion of the 
behavior stream which is never replicated is of no interest to 
a science of culture” (1964:73-74).
For the anthropologist to make endless records of episodes
is a futile endeavor, even with the phalanx of recorders that
Harris advocates for fieldwork.: What is needed is a technique
for identifying the more significant ones, Harris’s thoughts
on this matter are interesting (1964:75).
At this point we come face to face with what I 
consider to be the major dilemma of ethnography.
A choice among three options confronts us:
(1) We may ignore the whole question by proceed­
ing to emphasize those episodes which, for sub­
jective, momentary, and undefined reasons, strike 
out fancy - an option which seems to have been 
adopted more often than any other. (2) We may 
try to solve the problem by systematically attempt­
ing to discover which episodes in the total record 
the actors themselves regard as most important.
(3) We may seek to establish criteria of impor­
tance which do not depend upon the actors' judg­
ments .
After dismissing the first option out of hand, he pre­
sented a fatalistic argument against the second. He says, in 
effect, that the question "why" as it relates to goals, mean-
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ings, and purposes ". . . is of no avail, for no conceivable 
standards exist by which the whole true purpose can be dis­
entangled from the false partial, or consciously or uncon­
sciously distorted purpose" (1964:76).
The third alternative is considered to be fundamental
to solution of his problem. "Only in the observer-oriented
option is it possible to formulate a principle which can
theoretically be made to yield systematic, intersubjective
identifications and chains of significant episodes" (1964:76).
While admitting to the inability of this third option to be
carried out in principle, he maintains that it is theoretically
possible. Acknowledging that vast man-hours are required to
approximate it he advocates its pursuit:
. . . precisely because there is an ideal
solution,, one may speak of approximations 
toward or away from the operational model.
To follow the third option is to follow an 
asymptotic path toward the perfect solution.
The greater the labor input, the closer one 
can get to fulfilling the demands of the 
model (1964:77).
The model proposed by Harris begins with the following abstrac­
tion of an abstraction (1964:79-80):
Given any idio-episode chain, it is possible 
to inquire, with respect to each link, which 
links are its functional requisites. By ' 
counting the logico-physical requisites of 
each link, a graph may be plotted showing the 
rise and fall of antecedent requisites per 
idio-episode. Each peak of the curve repre­
sents an idio-episode which has required more 
antecedent links than its immediately ante­
cedent or subsequent links. Such peaks will 
be called nodes.
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However, this reduction does not totally resolve the problem. 
Nodal thresholds are arbitrarily established to isolate those 
nodes relevant for further study as higher level abstractions. 
The entire basis for their establishment is based on frequency 
of occurrence. That is, only those nodes having a count 
higher than an arbitrarily established number are worthy of 
consideration.
By reducing the field to a workable number of nodes,
. . . it is possible to inquire which of the 
nodes themselves are logico-physically depen­
dent upon one another. Starting with the 
later nodes we can work backward, listing 
as part of an independent chain all those 
nodes which exhibit an unbroken thread of 
logico-physical dependency (Harris, 1964:
83).
Nodes related in this manner are known as nodal chains.
Harris sees the significance of nodal analysis as a
counter proposal to traditional ethnology (1964:91):
In the usual actor-oriented approach to 
higher-order behavior units, one is obliged 
to accept the primitive given that the 
actor himself knows the "purpose" or "mean­
ing" of his behavior. In traditional eth­
nography, it is the actor himself who in 
effect establishes nodal thresholds, strings 
episodes together to form chains, and 
emphasizes some chains at the expense of 
others. Yet the assumptions implicit in 
this approach are totally alien to the spirit 
of science. The actor cannot join the com­
munity of observers unless he is capable of 
stating the operations by which he has been 
led to the knowledge of his "purpose."
Nodes and nodal chains have significance to the observer be ­
cause " . . .  they have meaning for the observer insofar as
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they represent regularly emitted and replicated behavior 
events which are functionally interdependent and involved 
in environmental feedback " (Harris, 1964:93).
The fourth level of abstraction, scenes, is derived 
from nodal chains. In construction of episodes specifica­
tion of place is essential. Thus, by concentrating upon 
places which are frequented by the actors the anthropologist 
is insured of finding rich (numerically) resources of behavior 
stream events. "The combination of physical and behavioral 
criteria results in the formation of a behavior stream unit 
which we will call a scene" (1964:95). A  scene is considered 
to have begun when the actors enter a place, and end when 
they leave.
A description of a scene may derive from the episode 
or nodal chain level. If these antecedent abstractions ren­
der information regarding the behavior going on in a specific 
place they amount to a partial description of the scene.
Thus, each episode in a bathing performance is considered to 
be a partial description of a bathing scene..
Description derived from the nodal chain level serves a
process similar to that for episodes and is best exemplified
by Harris (1964:96-97):
Ten informants were asked to check from a list 
of nodal chains those chains which they 
emitted when they first entered their bath­
rooms in the morning. The list of nodal 
chains was presented in vernacular terms, 
but the point being made here is adequately
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served by the responses obtained, since, if 
anything, the variability would be greater 
had the chains been given actonically pre­
cise definitions. The chains in question 
were the following:
1. Brush teeth 6. Urinate
2. Comb hair 7, Defecate
3. Wash hands 8, Take shower
4. Wash face 9. Dry hands
5. Shave 10. Dry face
The informants were asked to indicate the 
order of occurrence of these chains and to 
signify if any were emitted more than 
once . . . .
From this list of nodal chains we can pro­
pose certain hypotheses, which of course 
would have to be confirmed by a more ade­
quate sample.
Serials comprise the fifth and final level of abstrac­
tion; while Harris acknowledges that analysis of behavior 
units can be carried beyond this level of abstraction he 
feels it unnecessary to do so. A serial is simply the link­
ing together of recurrent scenes,
There are three ways in which Harris achieves linkage 
between scenes (1964:105-106):
(1) In a given place, one scene may follow 
another in a regular fashion. For example, 
each morning a very brief cleaning scene 
takes place in my office. The cleaning 
woman retires and the office remains devoid 
of behavior stream events. Later a new 
scene begins. A similar place-linked serial 
occurs in the household bathroom, as the 
respective members of the family enter and 
leave the precincts,
(2) A second type of linkage may be achieved 
by concentrating on the actone objects rather 
than on the place. Fish brought to the beach
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by a fisherman, taken to the weighing hut by 
two little boys, put in a basket on a muleVs 
back by a porter, taken to an icebox, put in 
a truck by a \\?holesaler, taken out of the 
truck by the truckdriver, put on a shelf by 
a retailer, and carried home by a housewife, 
link together a series of scenes whose actor- 
types and place coordinates are of the most 
diverse sorts. ....
(3) The third type of scene linkage is 
achieved by the continuity of personnel 
rather than place or object. The observer 
follows the fisherman rather than the fish.
The fisherman regularly moves from his house 
to the beach, to his boat, to the fishing 
grounds, to the beach, to his house, etc.
The housewife moves from the bedroom to the 
bathroom, to the kitchen, to the car, to the 
store, to the car, etc. '
While these types of linkage may be applied to single actor
scenes Harris defines the central concern of social science to
be the linkage of multi-actor scenes, , . namely, groups of
actors who recurrently engage in interactive and interlinked
behavior” (1964:106).
In summary of this model, perhaps a chart will serve
Serials 
Scenes
Episode chain Nodes
Episodes 
Actones
The actones are the smallest and fundamental unit of cul­
ture in the behavior stream. Once the actones are recorded, 
analysis can be performed at the episode level. Here intro-
Stage
Nodal chain
Coordinates
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duction of stage coordinates is made and these continue to 
center analysis throughout subsequent levels.■ Statistical 
analysis and the principle of frequency of occurrence serve 
to make the.third level of abstraction manageable. Scenes 
are abstractions derived from episode and nodal chains in 
terms of stage coordinates. Serials are a further abstrac­
tion dealing with the linkage between scenes>
I have discussed only half of Harris’s behavioristic, 
model: however., I believe this to be more than adequate for
purposes of this paper. The theme of the second half of his 
model is similar to that above, namely, that operant observa­
tion (i.e., empirical observation of behavioral actions) 
rather than participant observation is the key to scientific 
analysis in anthropology.
Pursuing the principle of operant observation as employed 
by Harris, especially in regard to his position on recording 
actones, I can find no significant difference between it and 
the cynical thrust of Ambrose Bierce’s observation regarding 
aborigines: ’’Persons of little worth found cumbering the
soil of a newly discovered country. They soon cease to cum­
ber; they fertilize” (1957:2). In short, one anthropologist 
in a subject culture creates a sizable disruption, but the 
small army as advocated by Harris would result in nothing 
short of destruction of the culture that was initially intended 
for study. The introduction of a single alien element into a
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homogenous structure will result in the isolation and/or 
eventual absorption of this element, However, when large 
numbers of an alien element are introduced, the original 
structure takes on a. new form and ceases to exist in its 
original state; e.g., a single person might take snapshots 
in an isolated village and little if any, appreciable effect 
is noted; but if a movie-making crew came to this same village,
the effects would be tantamount to a total destruction of much
of the original life style in that community.
Harris’s primary concern is to construct an operational 
data language. To this end he has sought to define culture 
in behavioristic terms. By focusing upon what he calls "the 
behavior stream" he believes he can break it down into com­
ponent parts. These parts, then, will manifest themselves 
throughout all cultures. By establishing their universal 
presence, an operational data language can be developed that 
will lead to intersubjective analysis of all cultures. He 
seeks the same regularity for the rest of culture that he 
finds in language. The following excerpt appears fundamental 
to his position (1964:153):
It seems to me, however, that a purely pragmatic 
type of synonymy can be demonstrated in all
natural language simply by substituting certain
words and phrases in a given utterance and inquir­
ing whether the meaning has changed. As long as 
the question of synonymy is posed with respect to 
abstract situations, we may expect some degree of 
concordance.
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I interpret this to mean that if a ’’pragmatic type of synonymy” 
exists in language, then such synonymy exists in other abstract 
levels of culture.
The emic aspects of culture are recognized, but then 
dismissed as being ultimately determined by cultural abstract­
i o n s .  "This means that if there is any consistent relation­
ship at all between etic and emic phenomena, it can only be 
one in which emic things are ultimately shaped by the condi­
tions of the material world” (Harris, 1964:170).
The example Harris uses to illuminate how stage coordi­
nates combine with actones to form an episode is in part con­
sistent with the contradiction that arises when his model is 
employed in the real world. For a model that purports to be 
divorced from emic meaning and purpose, extensive use is 
made of terms heavily loaded in this realm. ’’Sunday mornings” 
is employed as a time coordinate, but for it to have any rele­
vancy we must know the significance of "Sunday” and of "morn­
ing.” The actone object (a chalice) and place-type (in 
church) may independently be considered intersubjective but 
when occurring together, as above, create a situation in 
which only their meanings can lend relevency. While initially 
avoiding the terminology, Harris finally admits that his 
actor-types’.(a class of actors) are priests. If this is 
representative of what happens when his model is employed, 
and I believe it is, then one can safely say he has not
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legitimately circumvented meaning and purpose, but rather 
chosen to rationalize them away.
In.his criticism of participant observation--seeking to 
determine meaning and purpose of behavior, at the emic level-- 
he raises one fundamental problem: that of informant distor­
tion. While there is no foolproof technique of eliminating 
this possibility, it can be overcome, to a large degree, by 
reliance on more than one informant and through the observers’ 
own knowledge, acquired by personal experience. However, to 
completely discard the question "why" not only violates the 
cannons of good journalism, which Harris purports to have 
incorporated, into his operant observer approach, but strikes 
a blow at the fundamental objective of anthropology.
In chapter 2, we briefly reviewed the narrow inductivist 
model of the scientific method, which holds that hypotheses 
are derived from observed data via mechanical rules. I can 
find little fundamental difference between this and Harris’s 
model. The basic starting point in operant observation is 
observation and recording of all actones, which is quite 
similar to recording of all facts. From these actones Harris 
inductively arrives at subsequent levels of abstractions.
This is achieved by analysis and classifications without 
hypothesis. The approach, in both cases, is one of omni­
science, The scientific method, being mortal, is selective 
in nature.
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The fundamental point made by Harris regarding the nature 
of cultural things, chapter 2, is well taken. No two things 
are the same and we must, then, deal with them in terms of 
classifications. But the proposal to construct inductively 
subsequent abstractions out of antecedent ones, is an ab­
surdity. Rather than seeking truth in the relation between 
the observer and what is observed, Harris sees truth as a 
dream and dreams more dreams.
Harris constructs an etic methodology upon faulty deduc­
tive foundations. His reduction of culture to levels of 
abstraction permits his construction of models similar to 
the synonymy for verbal units. However, these models are 
derived from the culture of the investigator and not the sub­
ject culture. The subject culture is analyzed totally in 
terms of abstraction in relation to a grand scale. In short, 
Harris would study and analyze a culture In accordance with 
a preconceived scale of abstract levels; i.e., every culture 
is seen to have actones, episodes, nodes, etc.
The same criticism raised before must be voiced again.
For the anthropologist to perform any meaningful etic analysis 
he must first seek to grasp the subject culture’s world view 
in terms of that culture’s perspectives, not solely in terms 
of a predetermined model drawn from his own culture. For, 
to employ the latter course is to make all cultures an exten­
sion of his own.
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The anthropologist, not unlike his colleagues in the 
physical and biological sciences, utilizes his etic manifesta­
tions in a deductive sense when approaching cultural data for 
study. Instead of wearing a white smock and rearranging 
atoms in a laboratory setting, he wears a pith helmet and 
rearranges hypotheses as dictated by the data found in the 
field. In short, preconceived hypotheses are taken into the 
field and thrown against the data to see if they fit. More 
often than not change is required; change to the theories and 
also (perhaps) to the technical language used in the discip- 
1 ine.
Before leaving Harris, to pursue this fundamental point, 
it must be stated that the ideal he purports is far different 
than what he actually does. In its purest form, the model 
outlined in this chapter would be inductively applied. That 
is, Harris would embark upon his odyssey with nothing in the 
way of hypotheses or theories. Once in the field these would 
somehow be. derived from the data. However, Harris, like any­
one else, cannot operate in this manner; thus he smuggles 
some auxiliary hypotheses along and slips them in when not 
observed. A simple example to illustrate: The basic element
of the behavior stream is an actone and he sets out to catch 
them. Purportedly he does not know what they will be, and 
like the facts sought by Wolfe--chapter 3--they will appear 
under an intense light of scrutiny. However, does this really
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happen? Of course not, he already knows what he is looking 
for; to use his own examples, push, pull, carry and drop.
If one takes Harris only this far, the charge of indue- 
tivism would be of little interest aside for philosophical 
entertainment. In the smokescreen of jargon that he emits 
he would have us believe he is avoiding the deductive ap­
proach and thereby has done away with the need for an incor­
poration of an emic analysis. But in reality he has not, and, 
as stated before, he rationalizes it away. In other words, 
he applies his theories to the data and in instances of dis- 
confirming evidence would attempt to modify the data rather 
than his theories.
In chapter 3 I briefly touched upon a salient aspect of 
anthropological methodology when the discussion turned to 
description. I acknowledged descriptive methods as a prin­
ciple means for establishing boundaries of technical defini­
tions. This general theme requires further elaboration. The 
changes required in initial hypotheses when tested against 
cultural data collected from the field are easily enough 
perceived; the data disconfirms the hypothesis and the theory 
is revised. The situation is not unlike that of the physicist 
who, upon testing, receives disconfirmation. The original 
hypothesis is either revised by addition of an auxiliary 
hypothesis or is discarded in favor of another. What is a 
bit more difficult to visualize is how cultural data affects
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change upon well established disciplinary theories. I will 
conclude this chapter with illustrations of how two very 
prominent scholars, writing in the formative years of anthro­
pology, failed to realize this principle. Perhaps a more 
accurate charge is that they sought to, in effect, change the 
data itself or ignore disconfirming evidence.
The initial personage was first encountered in chapter 4 
during the discussion concerning Boas’s recognition of the 
necessity to perform fieldwork.. Contained here are two 
examples of how Morgan’s failure to perform fieldwork re­
sulted in procreation of erroneous theory. In the later case, 
his inability to correctly interpret data because of his faith 
in his general theory is revealing,
Lewis H. Morgan, writing during the final quarter of the 
nineteenth century, was one of the initial ’’modern” anthropolo­
gists, One of his principal areas of study was kinship; he 
"held that the family was a late product which had been almost 
uniformly preceded by the sib” (Lowie, 1920:147). For those 
unfamiliar with the term ”sib" the concept of ’’clan” can be 
substituted. Morgan held that the sib was practically a 
universal occurrence. However, as more research'was per­
formed it became evident that the sib did not have the univer­
sal properties once attributed to it. Rather, it seems to 
appear when the basic means of subsistence has changed from 
hunting and gathering to horticultural or pastoral activities.
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There exist vast regions of the world, to say nothing of 
North America, where there is no sib organization.
It must be realized that Morgan’s theory held wide accep­
tance for several decades. However, with the opening of the 
American west and increased study throughout the world the 
basic concept was modified as conflicting data was revealed. 
Finally, Lowie writes (1920:147):
The bilateral family is an absolutely universal 
institution; on the other hand, the unilateral 
sib has only a restricted though wide distribu­
tion. . . .  A survey of the data clearly shows 
that the family is omnipresent at every stage 
of culture; that at a higher level it is fre­
quently coupled with a sib organization; and 
that at a still higher level the sib disappears.
Morgan offers us yet another example. This time we ob­
serve the distortion caused by misinterpretation of the data.
An evolutionary syndrome, popularized by the biological sciences 
held many American scholars captive; and Morgan was no excep­
tion. Subsequently, Morgan developed a scheme for the evolu­
tion of human marriage. His second stage, the ’’consanguine 
family,” is characterized by permitting the intermarriage of 
brothers and sisters but prohibiting that of parent and child.
He uses as an example the Polynesians and offers as proof the 
Hawaiian method of designating kin.
That method is of a simpler character than the 
one usually found in savage tribes. While 
many primitive peoples carefully distinguish 
between maternal and paternal relatives, the 
Hawaiians not only draw no such distinction but 
apply their kinship terms so as to include 
all relatives of the same generation regard­
less of propinquity (Lowie, 1920:57).
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Morgan maintained a tacit assumption that a unilinear scheme 
of evolution underlies the development of human marriage from 
an original stage of promiscuity to the current stage of 
monogamy. It is from this hypothesis that the consanguine 
family follows immediately after a state of promiscuity.
Lowie offers a resounding rebuke to inclusion of the
Polynesians in this stage (1920:57-58):
Yet had Morgan not been smitten with purblind­
ness by his theoretical prepossessions, he 
might well have paused before ascribing to the 
Polynesians the part they play in his scheme.
For the aboriginal civilization of Polynesis, 
instead of suggesting by its crudeness an ex­
treme antiquity for any and all of its consti­
tuents , must rank among the very noblest of 
cultures devoid of the metallurgical art. When 
Morgan assigned to this settled, politically 
organized and marvelously aesthetic race the 
lowest status among surviving divisions of 
mankind he attained the highwater level of 
absurdity, which accounts of Oceanian explora­
tion accessible even in his day would have 
sufficed to expose.
For my final example, I shall turn to an extreme diffu- 
sionist position, one that the British Functionalists (chapter 4) 
argued against. Unlike the early evolutionists, the diffu- 
sionists performed fieldwork, perhaps too much; for they be­
came enamored with their subject culture and sought to explain 
similar cultural traits throughout the world as derivations 
from the "mother culture." This could perhaps be entitled 
inverse ethnocentrism and lays bare a fundamental methological 
principle; namely, before comparative studies of different cul­
tures can be performed a history or, in another sense, an emic
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understanding of each culture must be established so that 
similar cultural traits that are not the same maintain their 
distinction for purposes of analysis.
The German diffusionists presented, anthropological theory 
with the "Kulturkreislehre." Among its leading progenitors 
is Fritz Graebner. Human culture is viewed to occur in layers 
similar to geological strats, Since Graebners* theater of 
operation was Oceania it is here that the six distinctive 
levels are most evident, "The ’Kreise* are before us as 
ultimate axioms and by ingenious shuffling of their consti- 
tuents the whole of civilization is explained. But what led 
to the definition of the complexes?” (Lowie, 1937:180); his 
first and last "Kreise" are geographically defined while the 
rest are a priori statements of relationships between the 
elements of various cultures not necessarily in geographically 
contiguous areas. These relationships are stated to have been, 
at one time, a culture circle because of the logic of the in­
vestigator,
I shall briefly review two of the intermediate complexes. 
The first is entitled the Totemic complex and is defined as 
consisting of specific material elements, Graebner never 
really reveals how he derives the combination of traits he 
designates peculiar to this complex, Rather he simply estab­
lishes them and sets off to other areas to assess their 
presence. As he traces the complex to more distant regions 
the constituents diminish. In Africa he admits problems of
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consistency, attributing this to secondary diffusion. Herein 
lies a fundamental question: how is primary distinguished 
from secondary diffusion? "We observe merely that certain 
specific features cohere in particular localities. Only sub­
jective abstraction from immediate data establishes the 
hypothetical complex; and other scholars might well combine 
different features into equivalent TKreisMT (Lowie, 1937:181).
The Moiety complex is defined more in terms of socio­
logical than material traits. The Moiety complex is essen­
tially matrilineal as opposed to the patrilineal Totemic com­
plex. There exists the same problems of identifying this 
complex outside of the ’'cultural center" as traced for the 
Totemic complex. However, a problem is encountered when these 
"Kreise" merge. "Here we face one of the fallacies of the 
system, It is dogma to treat totems as primarily patrilineal 
and moieties as matrilineal, and then say that deviations 
from this norm must be due to blending. . . .  Of course, the 
facts can be fitted into the scheme by auxiliary hypothesis 
for each deviant, but such supplementary assumptions progres­
sively weaken the dogma” (Lowie, 1937:182).
Graebner does not make the mistakes of such extreme dif- 
fusionists as Perry; namely that of mistaking "analogies for 
homologous features" (Lowie, 1937:184), But what he is guilty 
of is faulty deduction. That is, failing to realize that a 
complex in Oceania is not necessarily similar to one found in
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North America and that it can be explained as having been 
derived independently. Lowie offers two examples (1937:
185) :
One feature shared by the.marginal Fuegians 
of South America with Graebner’s Old 
Australians is the type of dwelling, a wind­
screen or dome-shaped hut. These structures, 
however, are so crude and architecturally, 
undefined that their designations are only 
classificatory labels; and because the dwel­
lings are so simple they may have been in­
vented over and over again. . . . If the 
procedure is so obvious to primeval man, it 
can evidently have occurred also to his 
descendants, so from its distribution we 
can infer nothing as to dissemination. To 
take another Graebnerian trait, "skin cloth­
ing," a hunter is very likely to utilize the 
skin of his quarry, and no historical con­
clusion seems warranted from this common 
practice.
In pursuit of his scheme Graebner could be cast as a 
wanton geologist w h o , a f t e r  constructing his strata for one 
area would seek to identify them with similar levels else­
where. Perhaps the salient shortcoming is his failure to 
establish a history for each area, i.e., North America, South 
America, Africa, Asia, etc., that is independent of the 
original stratification for Oceania, The comparative method 
and certainly the theoretical tenet of historical reconstruc­
tion is independently to establish a sequence for each par­
ticular area, a sequence devoid of categories found else­
where, and eventually to combine them into a world scheme.
For the anthropologist to perform cross cultural or com­
parative studies without first realizing that cultures are
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different in many respects, but particularly in their world 
view, is unwise and unproductive. Although realizing this 
basic fact, there are those who presume that these differences 
are unimportant as they occur at the emic level and that, for 
purposes of their etic studies, it is essential to treat all 
cultures alike in respect to their abstract nature. But 
these behavioralists fail to realize that all etic theories 
are ethnocentric, at least insofar as they reflect the dis­
cipline of anthropology; thus to employ them without first 
attempting to temper the bias is to make all cultures an 
extension of the anthropologist or, more basically, of his 
subculture.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Fieldwork is the single most important means by which 
the anthropologist initially acquires data for emic under­
standings that will lead to subsequent etic analyses. This 
technique has developed primarily in response to a principle 
". . . that the culture must be seen through the eyes of 
those who live it in addition to the eyes of the scientific 
observer" (Edgerton and Langness, 1974:3}..
Participant observation Is the most fruitful approach 
employed in fieldwork. Through this approach the anthro­
pologist collects data for the initial emic process, grad­
ually developing an understanding that permits tentative 
description and structuring. Once the emic requirements 
have been achieved, the anthropologist can step back, so to 
speak, from the culture and test etic theories against the 
data. Participant observation is a two-part process. Both 
aspects must be employed as a continuum before any legitimate 
comparative studies can be undertaken. To use either the 
emic or the etic singularly will, more often than not, result 
in non-scientific analysis or distortion.
I do not propose the following as an etic analysis for
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the very fact that my being a member of the subculture 
creates a situation similar to that of the sociologist re­
marked upon in chapter 3. My familiarity with this subcul­
tural class prevents the detached objectivity required for 
etic studies. I could perform an emic review and approach 
the etic level. However, I have another purpose in mind: 
to be certain it is emic in nature.
As seen in chapter 3, the anthropologist goes forth into 
the field with, a definitive problem in mind. The anthropolo­
gist can use any one of many approaches or a combination 
thereof in pursuit of answers to his problem. We have re­
viewed several methods in this paper, e.g., the emic, the 
etic, participation observation and the behaviorist doctrine 
of Harris. My intent here is to take three approaches and 
demonstrate their use in approaching a problem--winning. The 
scene is a poker game, I realize that my '’problem'’ is most 
unconventional to anthropological research; however, it is 
purposive. ..
During the summer of 1974 the state of Montana legalized 
gambling in a very limited form: poker was one of the ’’games’1 
legalized, A combination of economic recession and the de­
sire for deviation from normal routine led me to involvement 
in this activity; first as a dealer and later as a player.
One of the first things I realized from my ringside seat 
behind the ’’rack” was the immense potential for employment
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of an approach somewhat similar to participant observation in 
quest of the ultimate objective--winning.
The position of dealer would serve ideally for etic 
studies. Establishments with which I was associated pro­
hibited their dealers from playing while working. Therefore, 
the essential element of detached objectivity can be main­
tained. At the same time, one’s immersion into the subculture 
is sufficient to permit emic studies. In this sense, it would 
serve as an ideal position to perform anthropological research 
employing the method of participant observation. However, 
being a member of the American culture I was unable to per­
form etic analysis. Thus, I utilized my position for more 
utilitarian purposes, namely ’’making book” on those persons 
frequenting the games; i.e., establishing the ’’history” of 
each individual’s approach to the game. This had certain 
practical benefits once I started to play. What follows is 
an emic description of my observations.
My next move into the poker scene was a change of roles 
from dealer to player. As a dealer I noticed there were three 
typical approaches utilized by nearly all players: (A) the
subjective; (B) the scientific; and (C) a combination of both 
A and B. In the discussion that follows the characteristics 
common to emic, etic and participant observer methods will 
surface and in a sense, perhaps, can be ascribed to the fore­
going classifications, I hasten to add that these relation-
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ships are not ones of equation, but rather of similarity.
In the approach bearing close resemblance to the emic 
is found the subjective player. He plays by "hunch” or "table 
feel." Nearly everything evolves around the "vibes" received 
from the table or other players. "Mr, Jones always wiggles 
his nose when he is bluffing" or "I just knew another 'eight* 
was coming"--as Mr. Smith paid $500 to draw to an inside 
straight--are explanations often heard of seemingly strange 
bets. It appears to me that contained herein are statements 
that embody the same sort of meaning that comprise emic state­
ments . The player is expressing his "world view" of the game . 
and playing totally in accordance with its dictates. The 
concepts and meanings are inherent to the subculture. As a 
matter of interest, this approach will result in a few wins 
and losses will be excessive. The player never realizes why 
the game often stops when he leaves for a few moments.
The player typifying a seemingly etic approach is the 
antithesis of the subjective player. Analysis is made in 
terms of theories external to the subculture of poker. To be 
sure, they are present in the subculture but derive their 
origin from without. This approach is typically "scientific" 
(statistical). All bets are made in strict accordance to 
probabilities. The size of the pot (ego's investment in rela­
tion to that from the other players) is weighed against the 
odds of making a particular hand. Also taken into considera­
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tion is the relative chance of the hand, once it is made, to 
win the pot. Mr. Brown has one dollar invested in a twenty- 
one dollar pot. It will cost him four more dollars to draw 
one card to a Royal Flush. The probability that.he will hit 
is 46 to 1 and the probability that he will then win the pot 
is virtually 99.999 percent. The probability that he x^ill 
hit a flush instead is 4.2 to 1. If he hits the flush, he is 
odds-on favorite to win. He could also hit a straight at 10.8 
to 1 which is a better than average hand. For my purposes it 
is not necessary to calculate the final statistics; it suffices 
to say that he will call and probably even raise. The odds 
are heavily stacked that if he hits he will win. Another 
example on the same theme: The game is draw poker. Our 
scientific player is sitting sixth hand with four spades. The 
man on the dealer's left opens, the next txvo players fold and 
the fourth man calls. Our player folds also because the odds 
of catching do not warrant drawing to a flush against two or 
at best three other players. A flush will be made once in 
every five draws, roughly, and this does not warrant drawing 
to it at less than 4 to 1 odds in the pot. This means four 
other players. Mr.. Jones’s nose has no relevancy here, in 
fact it is unobserved. The probability of a winning night is 
greatly increased because: (1) fewer hands are played and 
(2) every hand played has favorable percentages. Not only 
is the frequency of winning nights increased but the size of
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the win also increases.
The third approach I will metaphorically entitle "partici­
pant observation" because it utilizes both the subjective and 
scientific approaches. The player is aware of the "subculture 
particular" actions and meanings flowing like an undercurrent 
throughout the game. He is also acutely aware of the higher 
order statistical theories that can be applied to the game.
His approach is one that incorporates both aspects as an 
integrated whole. Relevancy is given to Mr. Jones’s nose and 
also to table feel. However, this plays only a small part in 
the overall approach (an important part nevertheless). Sta­
tistical analysis assumes the dominate role. I have called 
bad statistical bets on a hunch and ignored strong table 
"vibes” to fold bad statistical hands. Likewise, good sta­
tistical hands have been folded on the basis of table feel 
and good statistical bets made in spite of bad "vibes." On 
the whole, however, most adherence is to statistical mandates 
that are tempered by subjective feel. This type of player 
is a consistent winner and his winnings are consistently 
larger than those of players employing the subjective and 
scientific approaches separately.
It has been this experience with poker and the observa­
tions as noted above, that has led me to accept participant 
observation as a viable anthropological technique. This real 
world situation has lent substantial creditability to an
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approach that evidences similarity to participant observation.
Since anthropological studies are inquiries, in depth ■ 
rather than breadth, it is virtually impossible for an indi­
vidual objectively to study his own culture. We learn from 
birth to conform. This conformity very soon becomes uncon­
scious and we never gain a knowledge of the underlying cul­
tural structure. In short, one's culture acts as a blinder 
for attempting to see his own culture. Nor can withdrawal 
from the culture help, for a new conformity is created which 
is styled and is a reflection of the abdicated culture.
Thus, anthropologists must seek out alien cultures for
investigation. In so doing, they encounter new problems, as
seen by Spradely and McCurdy (1974:13);
To understand and describe an alien culture, 
anthropologists engage in fieldwork. When 
they first enter a new society everything 
seems strange and it is impossible to antici­
pate what, other people are going to do. The 
fieldworker does not know how to conform in 
this new setting, but by participation, ob­
servation, and listening to informants he 
learns to conform, to follow the rules of 
appropriate behavior. At first he makes 
many mistakes in both behavior and understand­
ing. In time the daily round of life becomes 
familiar and events are easier to anticipate 
and understand. Fieldwork is not merely an 
intellectual process of acquiring new infor­
mation; it involves the total person and is 
often a life changing event for anthropolo­
gists.
Culture shock cannot be overemphasized. Not only does 
it affect the participant observer psychologically but might 
even result in his demise. The common "peace" signal might
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be interpreted as a threat as could the almost universal hand­
shake., Common everyday activities to which the fieldworker 
pays scant attention will have new meanings, and the field- 
worker must not only realize cultural differences hut must 
accept these variations as a requirement for a new life style. 
It is fundamental that these conditions be realized by the 
prospective fieldworker about to embark upon his "rite of 
passage." Lee gives us a vivid first-hand insight Ci974:21):
I had been taught an object lesson by the bush- 
men; it had come from an unexpected corner and 
had hurt me in a vulnerable area. For the big 
black ox was to be the one totally generous, 
unstinting act of my year at /ai/ai, and I was 
quite unprepared for the reaction I received.
As I read it, their message was this: there
are no totally generous acts. All "acts" 
have an element of calculation. One black 
ox slaughtered at Christmas does not wipe 
out a year of careful manipulation of gifts 
given to serve your own ends. After all, to 
kill an animal and share the meat with people 
is really no more than Bushmen do for each 
other every day and with far less fanfare.
In accordince with the current scientific method, it is 
incumbent upon the prospective fieldworker to construct models 
of theoretical direction before beginning preparations for 
fieldwork.
. . .  an explicit methodology would be an 
advantage, for it would enable one to chart 
a course and to communicate to others the 
route you intend to follow. Afterwards, you 
could show how you got where you got to, and 
even if they didn’t know where that was, 
others could get there too, presumably, if 
they followed the same course (Berreman, 1966:
348).
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Herein lies a danger confronting all anthropologists. We 
must always remember that the original hypothesis (model) is 
nothing more than a tentative formulation. To allow this to 
influence or distort the actual findings of our investiga­
tion is not unlike the physicist deliberately ignoring oppos­
ing or disconfirming evidence. Unlike the physicist, whose 
findings are open to repeated verification, the anthropologist 
is often the only person in a position to testify as to the 
validity of his findings. If disconfirming evidence is found 
the hypothesis must be modified accordingly, often to the ex­
tent that it becomes unrecognizable.
As disconfirming instances come to light they will re­
sult in changes, to the original model. Also, introduction 
of new terms into the operational language of.our discipline 
may occur. This will have far-reaching.effects in that pre­
viously defined concepts will require modification or even 
total abandonment--e.g ., with continued kinship studies the 
"sib" as an operational term was replaced by the "clan" with 
a much redefined scope.
It is not unusual that the original model will have to be 
abandoned; often under the harsh light of reality, old hy­
potheses must be discarded in favor of new ones. Sometimes 
this will occur in the field, but most often this etic re­
structuring will occur away from the field setting: for the 
purpose of fieldwork is to gain an intuitive understanding
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and to describe what is observed. Once this is achieved 
etic studies are performed.
Recent methodological trends in anthropology appear 
gravitating toward polarization. There are behaviorists on 
the one hand advocating comparative methods that seek to cir­
cumvent the need for inclusion of cultural centered meaning 
in their investigations. On the other, hand there are those 
supporting methods that center upon the relevance of cultural
i
centered meaning with, no concern for higher order taxonomies. 
In either case, there is a drift away from the moderate 
epistemology characterizing the method of participant obser­
vation.
Certainly pursuit of one course with disregard for the 
other leads to either distortion and misinterpretation or a 
hodgepodge of insights that yield nothing concrete and usable. 
Thus, a fruitful area of approach must lie somewhere between 
these extremes, while retaining the better attributes of 
both.
I believe the emic and etic approach, or as it is some­
times termed, the idiographic and nomothetic, is the most 
practical method that can be used in anthropology today. Its 
applicability need not be confined to ethnology. There 
appear to be innumerable opportunities for its application 
in archaeology as well as physical anthropology. Nor must 
we be content to accept this as the final plateau of metho­
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dology. We must remain open to change, for anthropology, like 
the rest of science, is a continuum, an ongoing viable entity. 
To exclude change is to invite sterility.
The insights discussed throughout this paper are often 
necessarily assumed by the fieldworker but not as often 
articulated, not recognized by all, and moreover refuted by 
some. Thus, I believe the modest contribution offered here 
is of value.
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